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Abstract
Individuals form preferences through search, interviews, discussion, and inves-
tigation. In a stylized object allocation model, we characterize the equilibrium
learning strategies induced by different allocation rules and trace their wel-
fare consequences. Our analysis reveals that top trading cycles rules dominate
serial priority rules under inequality-averse measures of social welfare.
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1 Introduction
Individuals go to great lengths to investigate the value of goods that they may con-
sume: firms interview candidates, students visit colleges, consumers test drive cars,
and so on. How do these decisions interact with allocation rules? Toward an answer,
we directly model the preference formation stage as a strategic game.1 We model a
stylized object allocation problem in which individuals begin with common expected
values and each has an opportunity to learn the true personalized value of one ob-
ject. Within this framework, we evaluate two prominent families of assignment rules:
serial priority rules and top trading cycles (TTC) rules. Our model delivers two em-
phatic conclusions. First, learning incentives differ markedly across allocation rules
and equilibrium strategies depend crucially on their details . Second, all TTC rules
dominate all priority rules according to a range of inequality-averse social welfare
functions and are equivalent in the utilitarian sense.
1Our approach departs from standard practice of the literature on object allocation and moves
toward standard practice of the mechanism design literature where information acquisition has
become de rigueur (e.g., Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002)).
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An example: visiting colleges
To motivate our investigation and illustrate our results, we discuss an extended
example. Suppose there are three colleges, each with one available seat: an ivy
league school, a state school, and a technical school. In expectation, students rank
them in that order. The actual value a student receives by attending each school
is uncertain but can be learned by visiting. Concretely, a visit reveals whether the
school is a good fit or a bad fit for the student. Unfortunately, time constraints limit
the student to one trip, creating a decision problem: which campus should he visit?
Each school is a good or bad fit for each student independently with equal prob-
ability. Table 1 summarizes the relevant utility information.
School Good fit Bad fit Expectation
Ivy 14 4 9
State 12 2 7
Technical 10 0 5
Table 1: Utilities from each type of school in expectation and when realized as a good or
bad fit.
First consider a single student free to enroll at any school. If visiting a school
reveals it to be a good fit for the student, then he will choose it over each of the other
schools, about which he knows only the expected value. If visiting a school reveals
it to be a bad fit, then the student will prefer either of the remaining schools. The
student has three options: visit the ivy, state, or technical school. If he chooses to
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visit the ivy school, his expected utility is
Pr(good fit)u(ivy|good) + Pr(bad fit)E[u(state)]
= 1
2
· 14 + 1
2
· 7 = 10.5.
Similar calculations show that his expected utility from visiting the state school is
also 10.5 and from visiting the technical school is 9.5. Comparing these, the student
optimally visits either the ivy or state school.
Next, suppose there is a second student who must simultaneously decide where
to visit. Visitation decisions are now more complex: each student must consider
the visitation decision of the other student, as well as how the schools will resolve
potential conflict. To understand these incentives, we compare assignment rules.
Priority rule. Suppose the first student has higher priority at all schools, meaning
that he is able to attend his most preferred school regardless of the other student’s
preferences. This student may proceed as if facing a one-student problem, but the
second student’s problem is more complicated. How should he respond?
The second student expects the first student to choose one of his optimal visitation
strategies. As we saw above, the two strategies of the first student have the same
implications for the second student: between the ivy and the state schools precisely
one will remain available to him as the first student will take the other. If the second
student visits either of these schools and it is unavailable, he will have “wasted” his
opportunity to visit. To see this, suppose that he visits the ivy school. It is either
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available or unavailable to him with equal probability. So his expected utility is
Pr(ivy unavailable)E[u(state)]+
Pr(ivy available)
(
Pr(good fit)u(ivy|good) + Pr(bad fit)E[u(technical)])
= 1
2
· 7 + 1
2
(1
2
· 14 + 1
2
· 5) = 8.25.
A similar calculation shows that his expected utility from visiting the state school
is 8.75. If instead he visits the technical school, his visit always reveals useful infor-
mation: if it is a good fit, he enrolls; if it is a bad fit, he opts for whichever of the
other schools is available. His expected utility is
Pr(good fit)u(technical|good)+
Pr(bad fit)
(
Pr(ivy available)E[u(ivy)] + (1− Pr(ivy available))E[u(state)])
= 1
2
· 10 + 1
2
(1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 7) = 9.
The second student optimally visits the technical school. He prefers to visit a school
that is certain to be available, even though it has a lower expected value. Altogether,
the students’ expected utilities in equilibrium are 10.5 and 9 respectively.
Endowment (TTC) rule. Suppose the first student has higher priority at the ivy
school, but the second student has higher priority at the state school. Intuitively,
these priorities give each student a right-of-refusal at the school where he has higher
priority, effectively endowing him with the seat at that school.
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We suppose that the first student visits the ivy school2 and focus on the second
student. Given his priority, the second student knows that the state school will
always be available to him. In contrast, the ivy school will be available only if the
first student finds it to be a bad fit. This suggests that visiting the state school, the
second student’s “endowment”, is optimal. To confirm this, first suppose he visits
the ivy school. If the ivy school is available, he enrolls if he finds it to be a good fit
and otherwise chooses the state school. If the ivy school is unavailable, he compares
the state and technical schools by expected value and chooses the state school. His
expected utility is
Pr(ivy available)
(
Pr(good fit)u(ivy|good) + Pr(bad fit)E[u(state)])
+Pr(ivy unavailable)E[u(state)])
= 1
2
(1
2
· 14 + 1
2
· 7) + 1
2
· 7 = 8.75.
On the other hand, if he visits the state school, he is able to enroll whenever he finds
it to be a good fit. If he finds it to be a bad fit, he chooses the remaining school. His
expected utility is then
Pr(good fit)u(state|good)+
Pr(bad fit)
(
Pr(ivy available)E[u(ivy)] + Pr(ivy unavailable)E[u(technical)]
)
= 1
2
· 12 + 1
2
(1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 5) = 9.5.
2In fact, as further computation shows, this is his dominant strategy.
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The technical school is also guaranteed to be available and analogous computation
shows the second student’s expected utility when visiting it is 9. Thus, the sec-
ond student optimally visits the state school and obtains an expected utility of 9.5.
Reasoning similarly, the first student’s equilibrium expected utility is 10.
Comparing the rules, the change in priority at the state school moves it from
the first student’s effective endowment to the second student’s effective endowment.
As a result, the second student changes his visitation strategy and is also better off.
This illustrates our central conclusion: compared with priority rules, TTC rules lead
to more equal distributions of utility.3
Preview of results
We elaborate on the features of our model, all of which appear in the example.
First, objects have common expected values. This is appropriate when individuals
have access to similar information or consult the same source.4 We model values as
the common expected value plus an idiosyncratic private value. With this specifi-
cation, we are able to capture private values that follow essentially any symmetric
distribution, including uniform and normal distributions, as well as binary “good-
news/bad-news” distributions as in the example. Beyond symmetry, we assume that
private values are independent and identically distributed across individuals and ob-
jects. Thus, as in the example, whether one individual is a good or bad fit at one
3That the sums of the expected utilities are equal (9 + 10.5 = 9.5 + 10) also generalizes; the
rules are never Pareto-comparable but instead entail a redistribution of expected utility.
4For example, many college-bound seniors use the ranking of US News and World Reports as a
baseline. More prosaically, we assume a common prior.
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school provides no information about whether he is a good or bad fit at another
school, nor whether a different student is a good or bad fit at the original school.
Each individual has access to a learning technology that permits him to learn the
realization of one private value. We interpret this as a time constraint. Although
simple, this technology allows us to distinguish among rules according to the learning
incentives they provide. Moreover, by abstracting from cost considerations, we are
able to isolate incentives regarding what to learn rather than whether or how much
to learn.
After investigation, individuals report their preference rankings over objects to
a central authority that then applies a pre-determined rule to allocate the objects.
This induces a two-stage game:
• Investigation: each individual chooses an object to investigate.
• Reporting: each individual reports preferences to the central authority.
Choices at each stage are simultaneous. In the first stage, individuals choose strate-
gies to maximize their expected utility given the strategies of others. As our interest
is in the investigation stage, we restrict attention to strategy-proof rules. As each
individual then has a dominant strategy to truthfully report his preferences, we ab-
stract from this stage and assume truthful reports. Finally, while our model includes
cardinal utility information, the rules that we study are ordinal, thereby retaining
comparability with the standard model. Cardinal utilities permit expected utility
computations and allow us to consider measures of welfare that account for investi-
gation.
8
SD1
Pareto
frontier
SD2
TTC2
TTC1
U2
U1
0
Figure 1: Welfare comparisons. The figure shows each of two agents’ ex-ante utility
under the two priority rules and the two TTC rules. We mark the ex-ante utility profile
under the first priority rule (which favors agent 1) by SD1 and that under the second one
by SD2. Similarly, we mark the ex-ante utility profile under the first TTC rule (which
endows agent 1 with the ex-ante best object) by TTC1 and that under the second one
by TTC2. The horizontal axis measures the ex-ante utility of agent 1 and the vertical
axis measures the ex-ante utility of agent 2. As shown: (1) the utilitarian welfare is the
same for each of these rules; (2) the utility profile under each TTC rule Lorenz dominates
the utility profile under either priority rule; and (3) the priority rules are Pareto efficient
whereas the TTC rules are not.
To demonstrate the importance of learning incentives, we consider two promi-
nent families of rules: priority rules, each parameterized by a priority order; and
top trading cycles (TTC) rules, each parameterized by an endowment profile. We
first characterize the (Nash) equilibria of the learning game induced by each type of
rule (Proposition 1). Importantly, we show that all equilibria under a given rule are
unique in welfare terms. With equilibria in hand, we turn to welfare comparisons.
Our main result is that each TTC rule Lorenz dominates each priority rule, meaning
that TTC rules improve the welfare of those least well off (Theorem 1). Consequently,
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TTC rules also achieve higher social welfare according to every inequality-averse so-
cial welfare function (Corollary 1). In turn, this implies that TTC rules achieve
higher welfare under progressive measures including the Rawlsian max-min social
welfare function. In terms of utilitarian welfare, the rules are equivalent (Proposi-
tion 2). On the other hand, priority rules are Pareto-efficient whereas TTC rules may
not be (Proposition 3). Figure 1 illustrates our primary conclusions. Overall, our
analysis provides the first formal results confirming the strong intuition that TTC
rules are more fair than priority rules.
In discrete allocation problems, it is impossible to treat agents equally, an issue
often addressed by randomization. In our setting, randomization over rules occurs
before agents decide what to learn.5 Consequently, prior to this randomization, each
agent faces the same utility distribution. Comparing this common distribution under
priority and TTC rules, Proposition 2 tells us that the mean of this distribution is
the same. On the other hand, Theorem 1 tells us that the variance of the distribution
is greater under priority rules than under TTC rules.
Related literature
Recent literature underscores the importance of incorporating learning into economic
settings. For example, in an auction setting where agents may acquire information at
a cost, Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) single out the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mech-
5As we elaborate below and formalize in the appendix, the opposite order yields inferior welfare
outcomes.
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anism by efficiency properties.6 Similarly, studying two-sided matching, Drummond
and Boutilier (2013) and Rastegari et al. (2013) model firms that conduct interviews
in order to fill out partial rankings of candidates and seek to minimize the number
of interviews required to implement a stable matching.
Bade (2015) is the first to study endogenous information acquisition in the ob-
ject allocation context. Focusing on costly learning, she proposes a finite state space
model with partitional learning technologies and an ex-ante notion of efficiency that
accounts for these costs. She shows that, among group strategy-proof rules, only pri-
ority rules are robustly efficient: Priority rules are efficient for all admissible learning
technologies while all other group strategy-proof rules are Pareto-dominated by mod-
ified priority rules7 for at least some learning technologies. However, this provocative
result relies on the richness of possible learning technologies that cause some agents
to invest too little or too much in learning.8 By contrast, we specialize the learning
technology in order to explicitly solve for equilibrium strategies and analyze social
welfare across rules in a meaningful economic setting.9 Our results are decidedly less
favorable toward the priority rules: TTC rules are not only undominated by prior-
6Rogerson (1992) and Hatfield et al. (2014) use similar intuition to relate strategy-proofness
and incentives for investment prior to the allocation of resources.
7The modification allows the order of lower priority agents to depend on the objects chosen by
higher priority agents.
8A corollary in Harless (2015) shows that the characterization of the priority rules in Bade
(2015) extends to the case where learning is free, although the dominance relationships no longer
apply.
9To our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly solve for equilibria of a strategic investi-
gation game in the context of object allocation.
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ity rules, but achieve equivalent utilitarian welfare and outperform priority rules in
terms of equity.10
Our inequality comparisons apply the familiar Lorenz order, frequently used to
compare wealth and other distribution in terms of equity.11 While common in other
settings, the criterion has only recently been considered in object allocation. Pycia
and U¨nver (2016) use it to illustrate rules with “brokers.” Specifically, they consider
the problem of a manager who must assign one task to each worker under the “con-
straint” that one distinguished task ought not to be assigned to one distinguished
agent unless efficiency requires it. They show that, when all agents share the same
preference relation, which is drawn uniformly at random, a rule in which the distin-
guished agent brokers the distinguished object Lorenz dominates all “Hierarchical
Exchange” rules that respect the manager’s constraint. Harless (2015) also applies
the Lorenz order to compare object allocation rules. In a model with initial uncer-
tainty about preferences but no strategic learning, he shows that top trading cycles
rules are Lorenz dominant among Trading Cycles rules. Interpreted as a model in
which learning is free, these results reinforce the conclusions we draw here which are
10At the same time, we also find that TTC rules are inefficient, even with the additional structure
of our model and according to an ordinal notion of Pareto-dominance, reinforcing Bade (2015)’s
robustness conclusion.
11Since introduced by Lorenz (1905), the order has been widely applied to study wealth and
income inequality (see, e.g., Kakwani (1977), Seidl and Chakravarty (1992), Sen and Foster (1997),
and Cowell (2000)) and underlies the Gini coefficient measurements which appear even in popular
introductory textbooks (e.g., Krugman and Wells (2015) and Boyes and Melvin (2012)). It has
recently been applied to kidney exchange (Roth et al. 2005), object allocation (Pycia and U¨nver
2016), and bankruptcy problems (Thomson 2012).
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themselves entirely new.
To focus our analysis, we restrict attention to two prominent classes of rules in
the literature: priority12 and TTC13 rules.14 When preferences are known, there is
an important sense in which the families are equivalent (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez
1998):15 Imagine that the central authority may randomly select either one prior-
ity order or one endowment profile and then apply the corresponding priority or
TTC rule. Holding agents’ preferences fixed, their expected allocations are the same
whether randomizing over priority orders or endowment profiles.
With strategic learning, however, we observe an important difference: Randomiz-
ing over endowments yields a less variable utility distribution and thereby promotes
equity. Here we suppose that the results of randomization are announced before
learning decisions are finalized so that agents may condition their choices on this
information. Randomizing instead after agents investigate dampens their learning
incentives and decreases the benefits of learning, an intuition we formalize in Ap-
pendix A.6.1. The resulting ex-ante welfare loss carries a clear policy recommen-
dation: Randomize first. More generally, provide agents with as much information
about the rule as possible as early as possible.
While both TTC rules and priority rules achieve the same utilitarian social wel-
fare, they fail to maximize utilitarian welfare. In a companion paper (Harless and
12See, for instance, Svensson (1994) and Bu (2014).
13See, for instance, Ma (1994), Morrill (2013), and Anno (2015).
14Both of these are subclasses of Hierarchical Exchange rules (Pa´pai 2000a) and, in turn, of
Trading Cycles rules (Pycia and U¨nver 2016).
15See Pathak and Sethuraman (2011), Bade (2014), and Carroll (2014) for related equivalences.
See Liu and Pycia (2013) for such a result in large markets.
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Manjunath 2015), we compute the maximal utilitarian welfare that a social plan-
ner could achieve by optimally directing and observing the results of learning. To
maximize utilitarian welfare, the planner asks each agent to investigate a distinct
object. Since he observes the results of these investigations, whether an agent keeps
the object that he investigates depends on whether his private value for it is realized
to be positive or negative. Unless there is a single agent with a negative realization,
agents with positive realizations keep their objects and those with negative realiza-
tions exchange with others. If there is a single agent with a negative realization, he
and the agent with the smallest positive realization swap or keep their investigated
objects depending on the magnitudes of their realizations. Starkly, depending on the
distribution of private values,the common utilitarian welfare under TTC and priority
rules may achieve an arbitrarily large or arbitrarily small fraction of the maximal
utilitarian surplus beyond arbitrarily assigning objects without learning.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We formalize our model
in Section 2. We study the equilibrium welfare under priority and TTC rules in
Section 3. We conclude in Section 4. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
A finite set of objects A ≡ {a1, . . . , am} must be assigned to a finite set of agents
N ≡ {1, . . . , n} where 2 ≤ n = m so that each agent receives one object.16 Each
object a ∈ A has common value va ∈ R and no two objects have the same common
16Our analysis generalizes to cases where 2 ≤ n and 2 ≤ m. To ease exposition, we maintain
the assumption n = m in the body of the paper and relegate the full analysis to the appendix.
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value. Labeling objects in decreasing order of their common values, for each ak ∈ A,
let vk ≡ vak so that v1 > v2 > · · · > vm. For each agent i ∈ N , each object a ∈ A
also has a private value εia so the value of object a to agent i is
via ≡ va + εia.
The private values (εia)i∈N,a∈A are random variables which are initially unknown to
the agents but potentially discoverable. We assume that (εia)i∈N,a∈A are indepen-
dently and identically distributed according to a probability measure over R, which
is summarized by the cumulative distribution function (cdf) F . Additionally, we
assume:
1. Symmetry: the distribution is symmetric around zero.
2. Reversal: realizations of εia are above v1 − vm with positive probability.
3. Almost no ties: for each pair a, b ∈ A, there is no atom at va − vb.
Assumption (1) ensures that positive and negative realizations are equally likely.
Assumption (2) ensures that all pairwise comparisons can be reversed by sufficiently
high or low realizations of the private value. Assumption (3) ensures that, having
investigated one object, an agent is almost never indifferent between two objects. It is
satisfied, for example, by any distribution with a continuous cumulative distribution
When n > m, the last n−m agents play no role and can be safely ignored. When n < m, we must
extend each TTC rule to an appropriate Hierarchical Exchange rule (Pa´pai 2000a), but our results
are insensitive to the choice of extension.
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function. Using the ordering by common values, we simplify notation and write εij
for εiaj .
Returning to our introductory example, we capture this setting formally by la-
beling the ivy, state, and technical schools a1, a2, and a3 respectively. The common
expected utilities from attending each school are v1 = 9, v2 = 7, and v3 = 5. Ac-
cording to the “good-news/bad-news” technology, each school is either a good fit or
a bad fit, represented by εia ∈ {−5,+5} with F (·) taking the form of a probability
mass distribution with discontinuities placing full and equal weight on these two val-
ues. Since F (·) is symmetric and draws are independent, the example fits our formal
setting exactly.
2.1 Learning and equilibrium
Let P be the set of linear orders over A and P0 ≡ (a1, . . . , am). Initially, each agent
ranks the objects according to P0, but has the opportunity to learn his private value
for one object.17 Agent i’s investigation strategy is σi ∈ A and an investigation
strategy profile is σ ≡ (σi)i∈N . Agent i’s investigation reveals εiσi and revises his
ranking to Pi(εiσi). The updated ranking agrees with P0 on A\{σi}, although the
17This specification restricts attention to pure strategies, but allowing mixed investigation strate-
gies does not affect our results. In particular, for all rules we consider, there is at most one agent
whose best response is not unique. Even in this case, the agent’s choice among his best responses
has no implications for the strategies or welfare of other agents. See the proof in Appendix A.3 for
complete details.
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position of σi may differ.
18 In particular, for each a ∈ A\{σi}, σi Pi(εiσi) a if and
only if εiσi > va− vσi so that EF [via] = va < vσi + εiσi .19 By Assumption (3), Pi(εiσi)
is a linear order with probability 1, so we assume Pi(εiσi) ∈ P . Let εσ ≡ (εiσi)i∈N
and P (εσ) ≡ (Pi(εiσi))i∈N .
After learning, each agent i reports Pi ∈ P , (possibly different from Pi(εiσi)) to a
central authority which then applies a rule to determine the final allocation.20 The
set of (feasible) allocations is X ≡ {ν : N → A : ∀i, j ∈ N, if i 6= j then νi 6= νj}
so an allocation is a function that assigns a distinct object to each agent. A rule
ϕ : PN → X picks an allocation for each profile of reported preferences. A rule is
strategy-proof if, conditional on investigation, it is a weakly dominant strategy
for each agent i to report Pi(εiσi). As we are interested in understanding agents’
investigation strategies, we restrict attention to strategy-proof rules and henceforth
assume that they report P (εσ).
Let ϕ be a strategy-proof rule and σ ∈ AN . For each εσ, let ν(εσ) ≡ ϕ(P (εσ)).
That is, at the realization εσ, ν(εσ) is the realized allocation. Agent i’s expected
utility at σ under ϕ is
Ui(σ, ϕ) ≡ EF [viνi(εσ)] =
∫
· · ·
∫
viνi(εσ) dF (ε1σ1) · · · dF (εnσn).21
18By Assumption (1), for each pair a, b ∈ A\{σi}, EF [εia] = EF [εib] = 0. By independence
EF [va|εiσi ] = va and EF [vb|εiσi ] = vb. Thus, a Pi(εiσi) b if and only if va > vb.
19Given a random variable x distributed with cdf F and a function g, we denote the expected
value of g(x) by EF [g(x)].
20Equivalently, each agent reports a pair (σi, εi) ∈ A×R representing εiσi . We define reports as
preference rankings because our rules are defined over this domain.
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The decomposition follows by independence.
Although we model a two stage game in which agents first choose investigation
strategies and then submit preferences, we restrict attention to strategy-proof rules
and assume that each agent plays his weakly dominant strategy to report truthfully.
This allows us to abstract from the second stage and focus on learning incentives
and strategies. Our equilibrium notion is thus the standard Nash equilibrium of a
one-stage simultaneous move game. An equilibrium under ϕ is σ ∈ AN such that
for each i ∈ N and each σ′i ∈ A, Ui(σ, ϕ) ≥ Ui(σ′i, σ−i, ϕ).
2.2 Rules
We study two classes of strategy-proof rules: priority rules and top trading cycles
rules. Given an order ≺ over N , the priority rule associated with ≺, SD,22 begins
with an order over agents and uses their reported preferences to simulate sequential
choice: first, the agent with the highest priority is assigned his most preferred object,
then the agent with the second highest priority is assigned his most preferred object
21An equivalent way of defining Ui is as follows. For each i ∈ N and each ak ∈ A, let Bk ⊆ Rn+
be the realizations of εσ where νi(εσ) = ak. Then i’s expected utility is
∑n
k=1 Pr(εσ ∈ Bk)E[vk +
ik|εσ ∈ Bk]. If σi = al then for each l 6= k, E[εik|εσ ∈ Bk] = E[εik] = 0 since εσ contains no
information about εik. Thus, i’s expected utility is Pr(εσ ∈ Bl)E[εil|εσ ∈ Bl]+
∑n
k=1 Pr(εσ ∈ Bl)vk
which is identical to the expression above.
22We abbreviate priority rules by SD, suggestive of “serial dictatorship,” another common name
for these rules. This is to avoid confusion with preferences. Also, although each order in fact defines
a different rule, we suppress the dependence on the associated order whenever there is no confusion.
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among those that remain, and so on.23
Given an allocation µ ∈ X, the top trading cycles (TTC) rule associated
with µ, TTC,24 simulates trade according to Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm
(Shapley and Scarf 1974) as if µ were an endowment. Following the algorithm, each
agent points at the owner of his most preferred object. This forms at least one cycle.
Agents in a cycle are assigned the objects at whose owner they point and these agents
and objects are removed. Each unassigned agent now points at the owner of his most
preferred object among those that remain. This procedure continues until each agent
has been assigned an object.
Henceforth, when considering SD, we label the agents so that 1 ≺ 2 ≺ · · · ≺ n
and when considering TTC, we label the agents so that for each i ∈ N , µi = ai.
3 Comparison of rules
Our goal is to compare welfare under priority and TTC rules. Since we are interested
in equilibrium welfare, we first characterize the equilibria under each type of rule.
Proposition 1. Given a priority rule or a TTC rule, all equilibria are welfare equiv-
alent.25
23The sequential procedure is merely descriptive; in fact, agents simultaneously choose investi-
gation strategies before submitting preferences simultaneously.
24Again, we suppress the dependence on the associated endowment.
25As the proof relies only on the ordinal rankings of the objects, this result is robust to re-scaling
utility functions.
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The proof of Proposition 1 is constructive, identifying unique equilibrium strate-
gies for almost all agents. For a priority rule, there is a canonical equilibrium in
which each agent follows a “one down” strategy: The highest priority agent investi-
gates the object with the second highest common value, the second highest priority
agent investigates the object with the third highest common value, and so on. In
fact, except for the agents with highest and lowest priority, these equilibrium strate-
gies are unique. The first agent may alternatively investigate the object with the
highest common value. Because the distributions of private values are identical and
symmetric, this is just as informative as investigating the object with the second
highest common value. The last agent’s learning strategy is irrelevant; he receives
the final remaining object in each case.26
For a TTC rule, there is a canonical equilibrium with particularly simple struc-
ture: Each agent investigates his endowment. Except in the special case of two
agents and two objects, the equilibrium is unique. The two-agent case has multiple
welfare-equivalent equilibria because of symmetry, essentially for the same reasons
that the highest priority agent has multiple equilibrium strategies under a priority
rule.
Intuitively, under either type of rule, each agent learns about the best object
that is certain to be available to him. If he instead investigates an object that
may be unavailable, he risks wasting the opportunity to learn. Similarly, if more
than one object is certain to be available, investigating a worse object reduces the
26When n < m, the last agent also has a dominant strategy and investigates an+1. See the proof
in Appendix A.3.1 for details.
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potential benefit from investigation. This argument is somewhat subtle, but the key
observation is again symmetry: investigating a better object is more likely to lead
to a preference reversal with an even better object.27 The formal proof relies on
carefully specifying and comparing each agent’s option sets under various possible
scenarios. These results depend crucially on the assumption that the distributions
of private values are independent, symmetric, and identical.
Somewhat surprisingly, the total utility is the same under either type of rule.
From a utilitarian perspective, then, the rules are equivalent. Given an investigation
profile σ ∈ AN and rule ϕ, the utilitarian welfare of the pair (σ, ϕ) is U(σ, ϕ) ≡∑
N Ui(σ, ϕ). If there is a unique (in welfare terms) equilibrium under ϕ, say σ, we
let the utilitarian welfare of ϕ be U(σ, ϕ).
Proposition 2. Each TTC rule and each priority rule achieves the same utilitarian
social welfare.
According to Proposition 2, the difference between rules amounts to a transfer
of ex-ante expected utility among the agents. To better understand the equivalence,
consider a problem with two agents and two objects and suppose that both agents
investigate the first object, a learning profile consistent with an equilibrium under
either rule. The rules select different allocations precisely when both agents prefer
the second object: under SP, the first agent receives the second object; under TTC,
the second agent retains it. Nevertheless, the conditional expected value of each
object is the same for both agents; differently resolving this conflict simply transfers
27This is also why the argument does not apply to the first agent under a priority rule: there is
no “even better object” for comparison.
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the “benefit” from one agent to the other. While the general argument is more
complicated, the symmetry and independence of distributions allows us to extend
this logic to all equilibrium strategies as well as larger problems.
Both priority and TTC rules are members of the broader class of Hierarchical
Exchange rules (Pa´pai 2000a). For many applications, orders (for priority rules),
endowments (for TTC rules), or roles (more generally, for exchange rules) are chosen
at random (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 1998; Pathak and Sethuraman 2011; Bade
2014; Carroll 2014; Liu and Pycia 2013). In such contexts, uniform randomization
distributes Utilitarian social welfare equally among agents, making the Utilitarian
criterion a natural starting point. While Proposition 2 shows that TTC and priority
rules fare equally on this count, the comparison does not extend to all Hierarchical
Exchange rules. In fact, even very similar rules such as conditional priority rules
result in loss of welfare (see Appendix A.6.2).
Our main result compares the welfare distributions induced by TTC and priority
rules. General sentiment, reflected by “market” and “dictatorship” descriptions,
suggests that TTC rules are more equitable. Our model permits a direct comparison,
delivering the first formal statement confirming this idea. Moreover, leveraging the
structure of our equilibria, we are able to provide new and deep intuition for this
result and also its limitations.
Remark 1. Intuition for comparison between TTC and priority rules. As
members of the same larger family of Hierarchical Exchange rules, but TTC and
priority rules can be represented through inheritance structures (Pa´pai 2000a). A
priority rule begins with the first agent initially endowed with all of the objects and
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subsequent agents inheriting objects following the priority order. In our model, the
first agent always receives an object with one of the two highest common values. The
second agent therefore always inherits the remaining objects and may be thought of
as part of his endowment. Continuing, the second agent always receives an object
with one of the three highest common values, the third agent an object with one of
the four highest common values, and so on. Translating, we may represent a priority
rule by an endowment structure in which agent 1 is endowed with {a1, a2} and each
agent i > 1 is endowed with ai+1, allowing an+1 = ∅. Comparing this to the initial
endowments under TTC,
SD :
({a1, a2}, {a3}, {a4}, . . . , {an}, ∅)
TTC :
({a1}, {a2}, {a3}, . . . , {an−1}, {an})
Two comparisons are clear: Relative to TTC, the first agent’s endowment im-
proves under SD while the last agent’s worsens. For the remaining agents, the
comparison is ambiguous; the inheritance structure weakens their position with re-
spect to preceding agents, but strengthens their position with respect to following
agents.
The intuition of Remark 1 holds generally: The first agent is always better off
under a priority rule than under a TTC rule, whereas the last agent is always better
off under a TTC rule than under a priority rule. In fact, more is true: Each group of
agents at the bottom is better off under a TTC rule than under a priority rule. To
formalize, we make Lorenz comparisons (Lorenz 1905), adopting a tool commonly
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used to compare equity of wealth and other distributions. Let u, u′ ∈ RN be two
utility profiles with the same total utility. Then u Lorenz dominates u′ if the worst
off agent’s utility under u is at least as high as that of the worst off agent under u′,
the sum of the two worst off agents’ utilities under u is at least as high as that of
the two worst off agents under u′, and so on. Extending this definition to rules, one
rule Lorenz dominates another rule if the equilibrium utility profile under the first
Lorenz dominates that under the second. We have seen that all priority and TTC
rules are equivalent in terms of utilitarian social welfare (Proposition 2). However,
TTC rules are superior according to this more stringent criterion.28
Theorem 1. Each TTC rule Lorenz dominates each priority rule.
Appealing to Theorem 1 of Dasgupta et al. (1973), our Theorem 1 allows us
to unambiguously compare TTC and priority rules according to all strictly Schur-
concave social welfare functions.29 This inequality-averse class includes, for example,
the Rawlsian max-min social welfare function (Rawls 1972).30
Corollary 1. Each TTC rule dominates each priority rule according to each strictly
Schur-concave social welfare function.
28By examining the difference in equilibrium investigation strategies, the difference of each
agent’s utility is on the order of one object rank per agent.
29A social welfare function W : RN → R is Schur-concave if for each u ∈ RN and each N ×N
bistochastic matrix B, W (u) ≤ W (uB) with strict inequality whenever B is not a permutation
matrix. See Marshall et al. (2011).
30By results of Dasgupta et al. (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973), a similar result applies
for quasi-concave social welfare functions.
24
None of the social welfare functions that we consider depend on the identities of
the agents. That is, each measure is invariant to the renaming of agents or reshuffling
of their utilities. Consequently, when we compare two rules of the same kind (either
priority or TTC rules), they are equivalent under all of these criteria.
By way of comparison with standard model, we briefly discuss two extreme learn-
ing technologies: No learning and complete learning. When there is no learning,
agents rank objects according to their common values and therefore submit identical
preferences at the reporting stage. Consequently, TTC makes the same assignment
as the priority rule which orders agents according to the common values of their
endowments; there is no meaningful distinction between TTC and priority rules.
At the other extreme, when agents learn everything before submitting their pref-
erences, the welfare comparisons delivered by our model continue to apply: TTC
rules dominate priority rules in terms of equity.31 For intuition, consider the Rawl-
sian max-min criterion. Here, our comparison of “option sets” carries through. In
particular, the lowest priority agent under a priority rule has an option set that is
no larger – and typically smaller – than the option set of any agent under a TTC
rule. Consequently, the lowest priority agent is be better off under each TTC rule.
So each TTC rule dominates each SD rule according to the Rawlsian criterion.
In addition to our welfare comparisons, we are interested in whether Pareto im-
provements are possible when we account for learning. In our model, agents report
preference rankings, so we introduce a notion of efficiency that respects this informa-
31A formal analysis in the case of complete learning requires considerable additional argument.
Nevertheless, the conclusions follow from Harless (2015) which studies a (standard) object assign-
ment problem under uncertainty.
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tional assumption. Formally, an investigation profile σ ∈ AN and rule ϕ : PN → X
are jointly (Pareto) efficient if no alterative pair achieves an ex-ante Pareto im-
provement: for each σ′ ∈ AN and ϕ′ : PN → X, if there is i ∈ N such that
Ui(σ
′, ϕ′) > Ui(σ, ϕ), then there is j ∈ N such that Uj(σ′, ϕ′) < Uj(σ, ϕ). A rule
ϕ : PN → X is (Pareto) efficient if for each equilibrium σ ∈ AN under ϕ, the pair
(σ, ϕ) is ex-ante efficient.32
Proposition 3. Each priority rule is efficient. If there are at least three objects, no
TTC rule is efficient. However, no priority rule ever dominates a TTC rule.
The efficiency of priority rules is intuitive: a priority rule lexicographically favors
each agent in turn, so no agent can be made better off without making a higher
priority agent worse off.33 The analysis of TTC rules is more subtle. To provide
further intuition, we begin with an example illustrating the potential for ex-ante
Pareto improvement.
Example 1. Ex-ante inefficiency of TTC. Let and N ≡ {1, 2} and A ≡ {a, b}.
The personal value of each object is equally likely to be high, medium or low as
specified in the Table 1. In our model, this corresponds to va = 5, vb = 4, and
εiα ∈ {−4, 0, 4} each with equal probability. To see the potential for improving
over TTC, consider the equilibrium in which σ1 = a and σ2 = b. In the events
where private values are (M,L) or (L,M) (i.e., εσ = (0,−4) or εσ = (−4, 0)),
32A stronger notion would allow the assignment to depend on the realizations of private values
directly. Bade (2015) takes this approach and defines efficiency in terms of “outcome functions”.
33An easy adaptation of part of Theorem 2 in (Bade 2015) suffices to establish ex-ante efficiency,
so we omit the formal proof.
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L M H
a 1 5 9
b 0 4 8
Table 2: Two objects with three possible personal values.
TTC prescribes that each agent keep his endowment. These yield private values of
(5, 0) and (1, 8) respectively. Since these two events occur with equal probability,
conditional on one of these two events, agent 1’s expected utility is (5 + 1)/2 = 3
and agent 2’s expected utility is (0 + 8)/2 = 4. If instead we reverse the assignments
in these events, the agents receive the common value of the other object. So the
expected utilities conditional on one of these two events are 4 and 5 for agents 1
and 2 respectively. If we stick to the recommendations of TTC in all other events,
this yields an ex-ante Pareto improvement since these events occur with positive
probability.
As Example 1 shows, there may be room for ex-ante Pareto improvement
over TTC. If allowed to condition on the realizations of ε, we could directly im-
plement the Pareto improving trades described in the example. In fact, with at least
three objects, TTC can even be improved upon by an ordinal rule as required for
inefficiency by our definition. Intuitively, the rule infers the magnitude of εiσ(i) from
the position of α in Pi(εiσi) relative to the third object. Although coarse, this infor-
mation allows the rule to prescibe additional exchanges in which agents forego small
gains to avoid large losses. As constructing such a rule is somewhat delicate, we rele-
gate a complete example to the Appendix. Of course, neither type of improvement is
consistent with strategy-proofness at the reporting stage; after investigation, at least
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one agent prefers to keep his endowment an no longer has an incentive to truthfully
reveal his preferences.
Our Proposition 3 identifies an inefficiency qualitatively different from a similar
conclusion in Bade (2015) which is driven by learning costs. In particular, Theorem 1
implies that priority rules never dominate TTC rules. For a richer set of learning
technologies with varying costs (Bade 2015), under TTC, agents fail to internalize
the full benefits of learning and may choose not to investigate. In our setting, this
consideration is moot. Consequently, our inefficiency result for TTC strengthens her
conclusion in two ways: our result does not rely on the richness of the considered
learning technologies and our definition of Pareto dominance is more demanding,
requiring comparison with another ordinal rule.
4 Discussion
We extended the object allocation problem to allow learning, proposing a structured
model with ex-ante common values and a limited learning technology which allows
agents to investigate one object. This structure allows us to compare equilibrium
welfare when rules from two leading classes are applied to allocate objects. We show
that, while priority rules are Pareto efficient and TTC rules are not, TTC rules are
superior according to progressive measures of social welfare. More generally, we have
shown how the choice of allocation rule may shape agents’ learning choices with
implications for equity and welfare. Our analysis suggests that learning incentives
deserve expanded scrutiny.
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To illustrate the importance of learning incentives, we have made simplifying
assumptions to isolate their effects and provide clear descriptions. Loosely, these
assumptions divide into four groups. The first group are solely for expositional
clarity and made only in the body of the paper, such as equal numbers of agents and
objects. These are relaxed in the Appendix where we present general proofs.
The second group are employed in our proofs, but only superficially. For instance,
Assumption (2) says that the range of private values is large enough to reverse an
agent’s ranking between a1 and am with positive probability. This allows us to
focus on the single case where learning is most relevant34 when characterizing best
responses under TTC and priority rules. The intuition, proof techniques, and results
generalize, for instance, to a setting where only reversals between adjacent objects
have positive probability, though our slightly stronger assumption to eases exposition
and permits simpler statements of some results.35
Third are those assumptions essential to our equilibrium characterizations, in-
cluding symmetry of the distribution, identical distribution across objects, and unit
supply of objects. While our techniques can be adapted to these settings, equilib-
ria will necessarily depend on specific details of the distributions, jointly so in the
case where multiple copies of objects may be available. For example, with heteroge-
34At the opposite extreme, when no reversal is possible, the setting is equivalent to the standard
static model without learning.
35In the narrower setting, the equilibrium under TTC is no longer unique as some agents no
longer have strictly dominant strategies: The agent endowed with a1 is indifferent between inves-
tigating a1 and a2 while the agent endowed with an is indifferent between investigating an and
an−1.
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neous distributions, agents may prefer to investigate the same object. In a limit case
where only one object has a meaningful probability of reversal, then all agents will
investigate this object regardless of the rule. By allowing multiple copies of objects,
we encounter complications which take us even farther afield. With priority rules,
agents may prefer to investigate “up” rather than down.36 With TTC, even defining
the rule, which now must be extended to determine with whom one trades among
those endowed with a copy of the object, a choice with welfare consequences. Conse-
quently, while our techniques apply in principle to these situations on a case-by-case
basis, robust and generalizable results will require a qualitatively different analysis.
In the final group are those assumptions fundamental to our line of inquiry. To
expand learning opportunities or incorporate correlation among idiosyncratic values,
for example, would require a fundamentally different model. In addition to raising
complications analogous to those with multiple copies, expanding investigation op-
portunities requires first answering new modeling questions: May agents sequence
their learning, conditioning on early realizations, or must they commit to a full port-
folio of investigations ex-ante? If there are multiple equilibria, how does one select
36To elaborate, if there are q units of each object, then the first q agents face the same problem
as in the unit supply case. However, the q + 1st agent’s optimal strategy now depends on the
probability of preference reversal for any one of the first q agents between a1 and a2. From the
size of q and probability of reversal, this agent may be able to infer that copies of one or both
of the better object are available with near certainty and prefer to “risk” an investigation of a1
rather than a3. If he does investigate a3, however, the incentive to investigate higher objects may
grow only more pronounced for subsequent agents, possibly even violating even the monotonicity
of investigation strategies we observe in our model.
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among them? How are rules with multiple equilibria compared? Correlation raises
yet deeper questions, rendering none of our rules incentive compatible at the re-
porting stage.37 Fundamentally different rules are now appropriate, perhaps ones
which allow for structured sequencing of learning or communication among agents.
Extensions along these lines deserve attention from future research.
Among other avenues for future research, we may ask about the equilibria of ad-
ditional rules, particularly rules which are not strategy-proof. To the extent that such
rules are used in practice, we need to understand how they influence learning deci-
sions. Further extensions might move away from the one-to-one assignment problem.
Instead, agents may each receive a fixed number of objects.38 If we are interested in
equal treatment, we may turn to probabilistic assignments in the second stage.39 The
implications of our model for the school choice problem are also important to under-
stand. This would entail adding capacities and priorities to each object. Similarly,
in a two-sided matching model, agents on both sides may have opportunities to learn
about potential partners. Pursuing this extension may illuminate the mysterious
process of dating.
37In fact, Che et al. (2015) show that only constant rules are incentive compatible with interde-
pendent values, a robust result that is pervasive across many settings.
38See, for example, Pa´pai (2000b, 2001) and Klaus and Miyagawa (2001).
39See Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) and Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001).
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A Proofs and further examples
A.1 Preliminaries
We start with some notation. For each pair i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let pij ≡ 1 − F (|vi −
vj|) = F (−|vi − vj|) and ηij ≡ EF [x|x > vj − vi]. Then pij is the probability that
learning the private value of either ai or aj will reverse their ranking in an agent’s
preferences. Similarly, ηij is the expectation of an agent’s private value for ai given
that it is large enough to keep or raise ai above aj in the agent’s preference ranking.
For each pair i, j ∈ A with i < j, pij = pji > 0. However, ηij 6= ηji. Instead,
0 < ηij < ηji (see Lemma 1). Finally, for each i ∈ N and each P−i ∈ PN\{i},
agent i’s option set under ϕ is
Oi(P−i, ϕ) ≡ {a ∈ A : ∃Pi ∈ P such that ϕi(Pi, P−i) = a} .
Taking the preference reports of other agents as given, Oi(P−i, ϕ) represents those
objects that agent i may receive by varying his report. Given an event E, agent i’s
expected utility conditional on E is Ui(σ|E).
Next, we present a technical lemma that allows us to compare private values.
Lemma 1. For each triple i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with i < j < k,
1. pij = pji,
2. (1− pij)ηij = pijηji, and
3. pik(vk − vi + ηki) < pij(vj − vi + ηji).
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Proof. Let i, j, k ∈ A with i < j < k.
(1) By definition, pij = 1− F (|vi − vj|) = 1− F (|vj − vi|) = pji.
(2) By symmetry of F , for each α ∈ R+,
∫ α
−α
x dF (x) =
∫ 0
−α
x dF (x) +
∫ α
0
x dF (x)
=
∫ α
0
−x dF (x) +
∫ α
0
x dF (x)
= 0.
In particular,
∫ ∞
vj−vi
x dF (x) =
∫ vi−vj
vj−vi
x dF (x) +
∫ ∞
vi−vj
x dF (x) =
∫ ∞
vi−vj
x dF (x).
Since i < j, vj < vi and pij = F (−|vi − vj|) = F (vj − vi) = 1 − F (vi − vj). By
definition of conditional expectations,
ηij = EF [x|x > vj − vi] =
∫∞
vj−vi x dF (x)
1− F (vj − vi) =
∫∞
vj−vi x dF (x)
1− pij and
ηji = EF [x|x > vi − vj] =
∫∞
vi−vj x dF (x)
1− F (vi − vj) =
∫∞
vj−vi x dF (x)
pij
.
Therefore, (1− pij)ηij = pijηji.
(3) Since i < j < k, vk < vj < vi and pij < pik. As computed in (2),
pijηji =
∫ ∞
vi−vj
x dF (x) and
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pikηki =
∫ ∞
vi−vk
x dF (x).
Now comparing,
pijηji − pikηki =
∫ ∞
vi−vj
x dF (x)−
∫ ∞
vi−vk
x dF (x)
=
∫ vi−vk
vi−vj
x dF (x)
>
∫ vi−vk
vi−vj
vi − vj dF (x).
Additionally,
pij(vj − vi)− pik(vk − vi)
=
∫ ∞
vi−vj
vj − vi dF (x)−
∫ ∞
vi−vk
vk − vi dF (x)
=
∫ vi−vk
vi−vj
vj − vi dF (x) +
∫ ∞
vi−vk
(vj − vi)− (vk − vi) dF (x)
=
∫ vi−vk
vi−vj
vj − vi dF (x) +
∫ ∞
vi−vk
vj − vk dF (x)
>
∫ vi−vk
vi−vj
vj − vi dF (x).
Combining results,
pij(vj − vi + ηji)− pik(vk − vi + ηki) =
(
pijηji − pikηki
)
+
(
pij(vj − vi)− pik(vk − vi)
)
>
∫ vi−vk
vi−vj
vi − vj dF (x) +
∫ vi−vk
vi−vj
vj − vi dF (x)
= 0.
34
Therefore, pik(vk − vi + ηki) < pij(vj − vi + ηji).
Lemma 1(2) implies that for each pair i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with i < j, 0 < ηij < ηji
and vi < vj + ηji. Substituting according to definitions, Lemma 1(3) says that for
each h ∈ N , pikE[vhk|vhk > vi] < pijE[vhj|vhj > vi]. Since pik < pij, Lemma 1(3)
implies that pik(vk + ηki) < pij(vj + ηji), a form which will be convenient in some
computations.
A.2 Hierarchical exchange and unequal numbers of agents
and objects
While the case of 3 ≤ n = m simplifies exposition, our conclusions apply when we
allow for 2 ≤ m ≤ n. Since TTC rules are only defined for n = m, we extend each
TTC rule by including all additional objects in agent n’s endowment. Formally, each
TTC rule is extended to a Hierarchical Exchange rule by generalizing endowments
with inheritance hierarchies (Pa´pai 2000a): Each of the first n objects is the initial
endowment of a different agent and all remaining objects are included in agent n’s
initial endowment. To complete the inheritance hierarchy, we specify that whenever
agent n is removed during the top trading cycles algorithm, his untraded endowment
is inherited by the remaining agent with the highest index. Similarly, once that agent
is removed, his untraded endowment is again inherited by the remaining agent with
the highest priority and so on. This specification is for concreteness only; as we will
see, the inheritance structure for the last m−n objects plays no role in the analysis.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
We first show the result for priority rules in Section A.3.1 and then for TTC rules in
Section A.3.2.
A.3.1 Priority rules
Let SD be a priority rule. If n = m, then for each P ∈ PN , agent n receives the
object left over after others’ assignments are made, so SD(P ) is independent of Pn.
Since agent n’s investigation strategy has no effect on the allocation, each σn ∈ A
may be part of an equilibrium. As this is the only difference between the cases n = m
and n < m, suppose now that n < m.
Step 1: Equilibrium strategies for agent 1. Let σ−1 ∈ AN\{1}. First suppose
σ1 = a1. If ε11 > v2 − v1, then agent 1 reports P0 and receives a1. This occurs with
probability 1 − p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v1 + η12. If instead
ε11 < v2−v1, then agent 1 reports preferences with a2 at the top and receives a2. This
occurs with probability p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v2. Together,
U1(a1, σ−1) = (1− p12)(v1 + η12) + p12v2.
Next suppose σ1 = ak ∈ A\{a1}. If ε1k < v1−vk, then agent 1 reports preferences
with a1 on top and receives a1. This occurs with probability 1 − p1k and yields a
conditional expected utility of v1. If instead ε1k > v1 − vk, then agent 1 reports
preferences with ak at the top and receives ak. This occurs with probability p1k and
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yields a conditional expected utility of vk + ηk1. Together,
U1(ak, σ−1) = (1− p1k)v1 + p1k(vk + ηk1).
By Lemma 1(2), p1kηk1 = (1− p1k)η1k. If k = 2, then
U1(a2, σ−1) = (1− p12)v1 + p12v2 + p12η21
= (1− p12)v1 + p12v2 + (1− p12)η12
= U1(a1, σ−1).
Therefore, agent 1 is indifferent between investigating a1 and a2. For k > 2,
p1kηk1 =
∫
α≥v1−vk
α dF (α) <
∫
α≥v1−v2
α dF (α) = p12η21.
Also, p1k < p12 and vk − v1 < v2 − v1 so
U1(ak, σ−1) = (1− p1k)v1 + p1k(vk + ηk1)
= v1 + p1k(vk − v1) + p1kηk1
< v1 + p12(v2 − v1) + p12η21
= (1− p12)v1 + p12(v2 + η21)
= U1(a2, σ−1).
Therefore, for each k > 2, investigating ak is strictly dominated for agent 1.
Step 2: Equilibrium strategy for agent 2. Let σ−2 ∈ AN\{2} with σ1 ∈ {a1, a2}.
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Given σ1 ∈ {a1, a2}, agent 1 receives a1 with probability 1− p12 and receives a2 with
probability p12 independent of σ2. By computing expected utilities, we show that
σ2 = a3 is a unique best response for agent 2. Let σ2 = ak.
Case 1: k = 1. If agent 1 receives a1, then agent 2 receives a2 which yields a
conditional expected utility of v2. Suppose instead that agent 1 receives a2. If
ε21 > v3− v1, then agent 2 reports preferences with a1 at the top among A\{a2} and
receives a1. This occurs with probability 1 − p13 and yields a conditional expected
utility of v1 + η13. If instead ε21 < v3 − v1, then agent 2 reports preferences with
a3 at the top among A\{a2} and receives a3. This occurs with probability p13 and
yields a conditional expected utility of v3. Together,
U2(a1, σ−2) = (1− p12)v2 + p12
[
(1− p13)(v1 + η13) + p13v3
]
.
Case 2: k = 2. If agent 1 receives a2, then agent 2 receives a1 which yields a
conditional expected utility of v1. Suppose instead that agent 1 receives a1. If
ε22 > v3− v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with a2 at the top among A\{a1} and
receives a2. This occurs with probability 1 − p23 and yields a conditional expected
utility of v2 + η23. If instead ε22 < v3 − v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with
a3 at the top among A\{a1} and receives a3. This occurs with probability p23 and
yields a conditional expected utility of v3. Together,
U2(a2, σ−2) = (1− p12)
[
(1− p23)(v2 + η23) + p23v3
]
+ p12v1.
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Case 3: k ≥ 3. First, suppose agent 1 receives a1. If ε2k < v2−vk, then agent 2 reports
preferences with a1 and a2 at the top and receives a2. This occurs with probability
1− p2k and yields a conditional expected utility of v2. If instead ε2k > v2 − vk, then
agent 2 reports preferences with a1 and ak at the top and receives ak. This occurs
with probability p2k and yields a conditional expected utility of vk + ηk2. Second,
suppose agent 1 receives a2. If ε2k < v1 − vk, then agent 2 reports preferences with
a1 at the top and receives a1. This occurs with probability 1 − p1k and yields a
conditional expected utility of v1. If instead ε2k > v1 − vk, then agent 2 reports
preferences with ak at the top and receives ak. This occurs with probability p1k and
yields a conditional expected utility of vk + ηk1. Together,
U2(ak, σ−2) = (1− p12)
[
(1− p2k)v2 + p2k(vk + ηk2)
]
+ p12
[
(1− p1k)v1 + p1k(vk + ηk1)
]
.
We now compare these expected utilities. For k > 3, by Lemma 1(3), p1kηk1 <
p13η31 and p2kηk2 < p23η32. Also, p1k < p13, p2k < p23, vk − v1 < v3 − v1, and
vk − v2 < v3 − v2. Therefore,
(1− p2k)v2 + p2k(vk + ηk2) < (1− p23)v2 + p23(v3 + η32) and
(1− p1k)v1 + p1k(vk + ηk1) < (1− p13)v1 + p13(v3 + η31)
so U2(ak, σ−2) < U2(a3, σ−2).
Next, by Lemma 1(2), p13η31 = (1 − p13)η13 and p23η32 = (1 − p23)η23. Also, by
39
definition, v3 + η32 > v2 and v3 + η31 > v1. Therefore,
U2(a3, σ−2) = (1− p12)
[
(1− p23)v2 + p23(v3 + η32)
]
+ p12
[
(1− p13)v1 + p13(v3 + η31)
]
> (1− p12)v2 + p12
[
(1− p13)v1 + p13v3 + p13η31
]
= (1− p12)v2 + p12
[
(1− p13)v1 + p13v3 + (1− p13)η13
]
= U2(a1, σ−2).
Similarly,
U2(a3, σ−2) = (1− p12)
[
(1− p23)v2 + p23(v3 + η32)
]
+ p12
[
(1− p13)v1 + p13(v3 + η31)
]
> (1− p12)
[
(1− p23)v2 + p23v3 + p23η32
]
+ p12v1
> (1− p12)
[
(1− p23)v2 + p23v3 + (1− p23)η23
]
+ p12v1
= U2(a2, σ−2).
Altogether, conditional on agent 1 choosing one of his dominant strategies, σ2 = a3
is a unique best response for agent 2.
Step 3: Equilibrium strategy for agent i, 3 ≤ i < m. The logic is similar to
Step 2. Let σ−i ∈ AN\{i} with σ1 ∈ {a1, a2} and for each j ∈ {2, . . . , i−1}, σj = σj+1.
Then agents {1, . . . , i − 1} collectively receive i − 1 of the objects {a1, . . . , ai}. Let
σi = ak. Suppose al ∈ {a1, . . . , ai} is the object none of the agents {1, . . . , i − 1}
receive.
Case 1: k ≤ i. If k 6= l, then agent i receives al which yields a conditional expected
utility of vl. By comparison, investigating ai+1 yields expected utility (1−pl(i+1))vl+
40
pl(i+1)(vi+1 + η(i+1)l) > vl.
Suppose instead that k = l. If εil > vi+1 − vl, then agent 2 reports preferences
with al above ai+1 and receives al. This occurs with probability 1 − pl(i+1) and
yields a conditional expected utility of vl + ηl(i+1). If instead εil < vi+1 − vl, then
agent 2 reports preferences with ai+1 above al and receives ai+1. This occurs with
probability pl(i+1) and yields a conditional expected utility of vi+1. Agent i’s expected
utility in this case is then (1 − pl(i+1))(vl + ηl(i+1)) + pl(i+1)vi+1. By comparison,
investigating ai+1 again yields expected utility (1− pl(i+1))vl + pl(i+1)(vi+1 + η(i+1)l).
Since (1− pl(i+1))ηl(i+1) = pl(i+1)η(i+1)l, the expected utility is the same under either
strategy. Since investigating ai+1 yields greater expected utility in the first case and
equal expected utility in this case, σi is strictly dominated.
Case 2: k ≥ i + 1. If εik < vl − vk, then agent 2 reports preferences with al above
ak and receives al. This occurs with probability 1 − plk and yields a conditional
expected utility of vl. If instead εik > vl − vk, then agent 2 reports preferences with
ak above al and receives ak. This occurs with probability plk and yields a conditional
expected utility of vk+ηkl. Therefore, agent i’s expected utility conditional on agents
{1, . . . , i−1} receiving {a1, . . . , ai}\{al} is (1−plk)vl+plk(vk+ηkl). By Lemma 1(3),
for k > i+ 1,
(1− plk)vl + plk(vk + ηkl) < (1− pl(i+1))vl + pl(i+1)(vi+1 + η(i+1)l).
Thus, investigating ak yields strictly lower expected utility than investigating ai+1 in
each case and the strategy is strictly dominated. Altogether, conditional on agents
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with higher priority best responding to the strategies of agents with even higher
priority, σi = ai+1 is a unique best response for agent i.
A.3.2 TTC rules
Suppose m ≥ 3. We consider the equilibrium strategies of the agents in order of the
common values of their endowments. We argue that each agent has a unique best
response to the equilibrium strategies of the preceding agents.
Step 1: Equilibrium strategies for agent 1. We show that σ1 = a1 is a strictly
dominant strategy for agent 1 by analyzing his option sets. Let P−1 ∈ PN\{1} and
O1 ≡ O1(P−1, TTC). By definition of TTC, a1 ∈ O1. Let ak ∈ A\{a1}. To compare
σ1 = ak and σ1 = a1, we consider two cases.
Case 1.1: ak ∈ O1. First consider σ1 = ak. If ε1k < v1 − vk, then agent 1 reports
preferences with a1 at the top and receives a1. This occurs with probability 1− p1k
and yields a conditional expected utility of v1. If instead ε1k > v1− vk, then agent 1
reports preferences with ak at the top and receives ak. This occurs with probability
p1k and yields a conditional expected utility of vk + ηk1. Then U1(ak, σ−1|ak ∈ O1) =
(1− p1k)v1 + p1k(vk + ηk1).
Now consider σ1 = a1. If ε11 > vk − v1, then agent 1 reports preferences with a1
above ak and receives a1 or a more preferred object. This occurs with probability
1 − p1k and yields a conditional expected utility of at least v1 + η1k. If instead
ε11 < vk − v1, then agent 1 reports preferences with ak above a1 and receives ak or
a more preferred object. This occurs with probability p1k and yields a conditional
expected utility of at least vk. Agent 1’s expected utility in this case is U1(a1, σ−1|ak ∈
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O1) ≥ (1− p1k)(v1 + η1k) + p1kvk.
By Lemma 1(2), p1kηk1 = (1 − p1k)η1k. Therefore, conditional on ak ∈ O1,
agent 1’s expected utility when investigating a1 is at least as great as his expected
utility when investigating ak.
Case 1.2: ak 6∈ O1. First consider σ1 = ak. Then agent 1 reports preferences with a1
at the top of O1 and receives a1. Then U1(ak, σ−1|ak 6∈ O1) = v1.
Now consider σ1 = a1. Since a1 ∈ O1, agent 1’s conditional expected utility is at
least v1. To see that it is strictly greater, let al ∈ A\{a1, ak}. For each σl, agent l
reports preferences with a1 at the top with positive probability. In this case, al ∈ O1.
Also, ε11 < vl − v1 with probability p1l > 0. Then agent 1 reports preferences with
al above a1. Since these events are independent, there is positive probability that
both al ∈ O1 and al P (ε11) a1. In this case, agent 1 receives al or a more preferred
object. Then U1(a1, σ−1|ak 6∈ O1) ≥ vl + ηl1 > v1.
Altogether, U1(ak, σ−1) < U1(a1, σ−1). Since this is true for each k 6= 1, σ1 = a1
is a strictly dominant strategy for agent 1.
Step 2: Equilibrium strategy for agent 2. We show that σ2 = a2 is a strict
best response to σ1 = a1. Let P−2 ∈ PN\{2} with P1 determined by σ1 and let
O2 ≡ O2(P−2, TTC). By definition of TTC, a2 ∈ O2. Moreover, a1 ∈ O2 with
probability p12 and a1 6∈ O2 with probability 1−p12 independent of agent 2’s strategy.
Let ak ∈ A\{a2}.
Case 2.1: k = 1. To compare σ2 = ak and σ2 = a2, we distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 2.1.1: a1 ∈ O2. First consider σ2 = a1. If ε21 > v2 − v1, then agent 2
reports preferences with a1 above a2 and receives a1. This occurs with probability
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1− p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v1 + η12. If instead ε21 < v2 − v1,
then agent 2 reports preferences with a2 above a1 and receives a2. This occurs with
probability p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v2. Then U2(a1, σ−2|a1 ∈
O2) = (1− p12)(v1 + η12) + p12v2.
Now consider σ2 = a2. If ε22 < v1 − v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with a1
above a2 and receives a1. This occurs with probability 1−p12 and yields a conditional
expected utility of v1. If instead ε22 > v1− v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with
a2 above a1 and receives a2. This occurs with probability p12 and yields a conditional
expected utility of v2 + η21. Then U2(a2, σ−2|a1 ∈ O2) = (1− p12)v1 + p12(v2 + η21).
By Lemma 1(2), p12η21 = (1 − p12)η12. Therefore, U2(a1, σ−2|a1 ∈ O2) =
U2(a2, σ−2|a1 ∈ O2).
Subcase 2.1.2: a1 6∈ O2. First consider σ2 = a1. Then agent 2 reports preferences
with a2 at the top of O2 and receives a2. Then U2(a1, σ−2|a1 6∈ O2) = v2.
Now consider σ2 = a2. Since a2 ∈ O2, agent 2’s conditional expected utility is at
least v2. To see that it is strictly greater, consider a3. For each σ3, agent 3 reports
preferences with a2 at the top of A\{a1} with positive probability. Whenever a1 6∈ O2,
a1 6∈ O3, so a3 ∈ O2. Also, ε22 < v3 − v2 with probability p23 > 0. In this event,
agent 2 reports preferences with a3 above a2. Since these events are independent,
they occur simultaneously with positive probability. In this joint event, agent 2
receives a3. Then U2(a2, σ−2|a1 6∈ O2) = v3 + η32 > v2.
Altogether, U2(a1, σ−2) < U2(a2, σ−2). Therefore, σ2 = a1 is strictly dominated.
Case 2.2: k > 2. To compare σ2 = ak and σ2 = a2, we distinguish four subcases.
Subcase 2.2.1: a1 ∈ O2 and ak ∈ O2. First consider σ2 = ak. If ε2k < v1 − vk,
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then agent 2 reports preferences with a1 at the top of O2 and receives a1. This occurs
with probability 1 − p1k and yields a conditional expected utility of v1. If instead
ε2k > v1−vk, then agent 2 reports preferences with ak at the top of O2 and receives ak.
This occurs with probability p1k and yields a conditional expected utility of vk + ηk1.
Then U2(ak, σ−2|a1 ∈ O2, ak ∈ O2) = (1−p1k)v1+p1k(vk+ηk1) = v1+p1k(vk−v1+ηk1).
Now consider σ2 = a2. Then agent 2 reports preferences with either a1 or a2
at the top of O2 and receives that object. Thus, as computed in Subcase 2.1.1,
U2(a2, σ−2|a1 ∈ O2, ak ∈ O2) = (1− p12)v1 + p12(v2 + η21) = v1 + p12(v2 − v1 + η21).
By Lemma 1(3), since 2 < k, p1k(vk − v1 + ηk1) < p12(v2 − v1 + η21). Therefore,
in this subcase agent 2’s expected utility when investigating a2 is higher than his
expected utility when investigating ak.
Subcase 2.2.2: a1 ∈ O2 and ak 6∈ O2. First consider σ2 = ak. Then agent 2
reports preferences with a1 at the top of O2 and receives a1. This yields a conditional
expected utility of v1. Now consider σ2 = a2. As in Subcase 2.1.1, agent 2’s expected
utility is again v1 + p12(v2 − v1 + η21) > v1. Thus, in this subcase agent 2’s expected
utility when investigating a2 is higher than his expected utility when investigating ak.
Subcase 2.2.3: a1 6∈ O2 and ak ∈ O2. First consider σ2 = ak. If ε2k < v2 − vk,
then agent 2 reports preferences with a2 above ak and receives a2. This occurs
with probability 1 − p2k and yields a conditional expected utility of v2. If instead
ε2k > v2 − vk, then agent 2 reports preferences with ak above a2 and receives ak.
This occurs with probability p2k and yields a conditional expected utility of vk + ηk2.
Then U2(ak, σ−2|a1 6∈ O2, ak ∈ O2) = (1− p2k)v2 + p2k(vk + η2k).
Now consider σ2 = a2. If ε22 > vk − v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with a2
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above ak and receives a2 or a more preferred object. This occurs with probability
1− p2k and yields a conditional expected utility of at least v2 + η2k. If instead ε22 <
vk − v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with ak above a2 and receives ak or a more
preferred object. This occurs with probability p2k and yields a conditional expected
utility of at least vk. Then U2(a2, σ−2|a1 6∈ O2, ak ∈ O2) ≥ (1−p2k)(v2 +η2k) +p2kvk.
By Lemma 1(2), p2kηk2 = (1−p2k)η2k. Therefore, U2(ak, σ−2|a1 6∈ O2, ak ∈ O2) ≤
U2(a2, σ−2|a1 6∈ O2, ak ∈ O2).
Subcase 2.2.4: a1 6∈ O2 and ak 6∈ O2. First consider σ2 = ak. Then agent 2
reports preferences with a2 at the top of O2 and receives a2. This yields a conditional
expected utility of v2. Now consider σ2 = a2. Since a2 ∈ O2, agent 2’s conditional
expected utility is at least v2. Thus, U2(ak, σ−2|a1 6∈ O2, ak 6∈ O2) ≤ U2(a2, σ−2|a1 6∈
O2, ak 6∈ O2).
Now a1 ∈ O2 with positive probability, so at least one of Subcases 2.2.1 and 2.2.2
occurs with positive probability. Therefore, U2(ak, σ−2) < U2(a2, σ−2). Combining
results, σ2 = a2 is a unique best response for agent 2.
Step 3: Equilibrium strategy for agent i, i ≥ 3. We show that σi = ai is a
best response to (σ1, . . . , σi−1) = (a1, . . . , ai−1). Let P−i ∈ PN\{i} where for each
j ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}, Pj is determined by σj and let Oi ≡ Oi(P−i, TTC). By definition
of TTC, ai ∈ Oi. Moreover, for each l ∈ {1, . . . , i− 1}, there is positive probability
that agent l reports preferences such that ai Pl al and for each j ∈ {1, . . . , i−1}\{l},
aj Pj al. In this case, al ∈ Oi. Therefore, for each al ∈ {a1, . . . , ai−1}, al ∈ Oi with
positive probability independent of agent i’s strategy.
Let ak ∈ A\{ai}, let vh ≡ max{vl : al ∈ Oi\{ak}}, and let ah be the object with
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common value vh. Since ai ∈ Oi, h ≤ i.
Case 3.1: k < i. We claim that (?) for each pair j, l ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1} with j 6= l,
{aj, al} 6⊆ Oi. To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that there is such a pair.
Then ai Pj aj and ai Pl al. Also, vi < vj and vi < vl. Since Pj and Pl are determined
by σj and σl, we have al Pj ai and aj Pl ai. But then agents j and l prefer trading
with each other to trading with agent i, so aj 6∈ Oi and al 6∈ Oi. To compare σi = ak
and σi = ai, we distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 3.1.1: ak ∈ Oi. Then by (?), ah = ai and agent i receives either ak or ai.
First consider σi = ak. If εik > vk−vi, then agent i reports preferences with ak at the
top of Oi and receives ak. This occurs with probability 1−pik and yields a conditional
expected utility of vk + ηki. If instead εik < vk − vi, then agent i reports preferences
with ai at the top of Oi and receives ai. This occurs with probability pik and yields a
conditional expected utility of vh. Then Ui(ak, σ−i|ak ∈ Oi) = (1−pik)(vk+ηki)+pikvi.
Now consider σi = ai. If εii < vk − vi, then agent i reports preferences with ak
at the top of Oi and receives ak. This occurs with probability 1 − pik and yields
a conditional expected utility of vk. If instead εii > vk − vi, then agent i reports
preferences with ai at the top of Oi and receives ai. This occurs with probability
pik and yields a conditional expected utility of vi + ηik. Then Ui(ai, σ−i|ak ∈ Oi) =
(1− pik)vk + pik(vi + ηik).
By Lemma 1(2), pikηik = (1 − pik)ηki. Therefore, Ui(ak, σ−i|ak ∈ Oi) =
Ui(ai, σ−i|ak ∈ Oi).
Subcase 3.1.2: ak 6∈ Oi. First consider σi = ak. Then agent i reports preferences
which rank Oi according to their common values and receives ah. Then for each
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j ∈ {1, . . . , i}, Ui(ak, σ−i|ak 6∈ Oi, h = j) = vh.
Now consider σi = ai. For each j ∈ {1, . . . , i−1} there is positive probability that
h = j, so we consider each of these events separately. If εii > vh − vi, then i reports
preferences with ai at the top of Oi and receives ai. This occurs with probability
pih and yields a conditional expected utility of vi + ηih. If instead εii < vh − vi,
then i reports preferences with ah at the top of Oi and receives ah. This occurs with
probability 1−pih and yields a conditional expected utility of vh. Then Ui(ai, σ−i|ak /∈
Oi, h = j) = (1 − pih)vh + pih(vi + ηih). By Lemma 1(2), pihηih = (1 − pih)ηhi.
Therefore Ui(ai, σ−i|ak /∈ Oi, h = j) > Ui(ak, σ−i|ak 6∈ Oi, h = j) = vh. If h = i, then
Ui(ai, σ−i|ak /∈ Oi, h = i) ≥ vi = Ui(ak, σ−i|ak 6∈ Oi, h = j).
Altogether, Ui(ak, σ−i) < Ui(ai, σ−i). Therefore, for k < i, σi = ak is not a best
response to (σ1, . . . , σi−1).
Case 3.2: k > i. To compare σi = ak and σi = ai, we distinguish four subcases.
Subcase 3.2.1: h < i and ak ∈ Oi. First consider σi = ak. If εik < vh − vk, then
agent 2 reports preferences with ah at the top of Oi and receives ah. This occurs
with probability 1 − phk and yields a conditional expected utility of vh. If instead
εik > vh−vk, then agent i reports preferences with ak at the top of Oi and receives ak.
This occurs with probability phk and yields a conditional expected utility of vk +ηkh.
Then Ui(ak, σ−i|h < i, ak ∈ Oi) = (1−phk)vh+phk(vk+ηkh) = vh+phk(vk−vh+ηkh).
Now consider σi = ai. Then agent i reports preferences with either ah or ai
at the top of Oi and receives that object. Thus, as computed in Subcase 3.1.1,
Ui(ai, σ−i|h < i, ak ∈ Oi) = (1− phi)vh + phi(vi + ηih) = vh + phi(vi − vh + ηih).
By Lemma 1(3), since h < i < k, phk(vk−vh+ηkh) < phi(vi−vh+ηih). Therefore,
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Ui(ak, σ−i|h < i, ak ∈ Oi) < Ui(ai, σ−i|h < i, ak ∈ Oi).
Subcase 3.2.2: h < i and ak 6∈ Oi. An argument identical to that in Subcase 3.1.2
shows that Ui(ak, σ−i|h < i, ak 6∈ Oi) < Ui(ai, σ−i|h < i, ak 6∈ Oi).
Subcase 3.2.3: h = i and ak ∈ Oi. First consider σi = ak. If εik < vi − vk,
then agent i reports preferences with ai above ak and receives ai. This occurs with
probability 1 − pik and yields a conditional expected utility of vi. If instead εik >
vi − vk, then agent i reports preferences with ak above ai and receives ak. This
occurs with probability pik and yields a conditional expected utility of vk+ηki. Then
Ui(ak, σ−i|h = i, ak ∈ Oi) = (1− pik)vi + pik(vk + ηki).
Now consider σi = ai. If εii > vk − vi, then agent i reports preferences with ai
above ak and receives ai or a more preferred object. This occurs with probability
1− pik and yields a conditional expected utility of at least vi + ηik. If instead εii <
vk − vi, then agent i reports preferences with ak above ai and receives ak or a more
preferred object. This occurs with probability pik and yields a conditional expected
utility of at least vk. Then Ui(ai, σ−i|h = i, ak ∈ Oi) ≥ (1− pik)(vi + ηik) + pikvk.
By Lemma 1(2), pikηki = (1 − pik)ηik. Therefore, Ui(ak, σ−i|h = i, ak ∈ Oi) ≤
Ui(ai, σ−i|h = i, ak ∈ Oi).
Subcase 3.2.4: h = i and ak 6∈ Oi. First consider σi = ak. Then agent i reports
preferences with ai at the top of Oi and receives ai. Then Ui(ak, σ−i|h = i, ak 6∈
Oi) = vi. Now consider σi = ai. Since ai ∈ Oi, Ui(ai, σ−i|h = i, ak 6∈ Oi) ≥ vi =
Ui(ak, σ−i|h = i, ak 6∈ Oi).
Now ah 6= ai with positive probability, so at least one of Subcases 3.2.1 and 3.2.2
occurs with positive probability. Therefore, Ui(ak, σ−i) < Ui(ai, σ−i). Thus, for k > i,
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σi = ak is not a best response to (σ1, . . . , σi−1). Instead, σi = ai is the unique best
response.
Summarizing, if m ≥ 3 and σ ∈ AN is an equilibrium profile, then for each i ∈ N ,
σi = ai.
We conclude by analyzing the special case n = m = 2. Let σ ∈ AN .
Agent 1: First suppose a2 ∈ O1. Under σ1 = a1, if ε11 > v2 − v1, then agent 1
reports preferences with a1 above a2 and receives a1. This occurs with probability
1− p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v1 + η12. If instead ε11 < v2 − v1,
then agent 1 reports preferences with a2 above a1 and receives a2. This occurs with
probability p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v2. Then U1(a1, σ2|a2 ∈
O1) = (1− p12)(v1 + η12) + p12v2.
Under σ1 = a2, if ε12 < v1 − v2, then agent 1 reports preferences with a1 above
a2 and receives a1. This occurs with probability 1 − p12 and yields a conditional
expected utility of v1. If instead ε12 > v1− v2, then agent 1 reports preferences with
a2 above a1 and receives a2. This occurs with probability p12 and yields a conditional
expected utility of v2 +η21. Then U1(a2, σ2|a2 ∈ O1) = (1−p12)v1 +p12(v2 +η21). By
Lemma 1(2), p12η21 = (1 − p12)η12. Therefore, U1(a1, σ2|a2 ∈ O1) = U1(a2, σ2|a2 ∈
O1).
Now suppose a2 6∈ O1. Then agent 1 receives a1. As this is independent of σ1,
U1(a1, σ2|a2 6∈ O1) = U1(a2, σ2|a2 6∈ O1) = v1. Altogether, U1(a1, σ2) = U1(a2, σ2).
Agent 2: First suppose a1 ∈ O2. Under σ2 = a1, if ε21 > v2 − v1, then agent 2
reports preferences with a1 above a2 and receives a1. This occurs with probability
1− p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v1 + η12. If instead ε21 < v2 − v1,
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then agent 2 reports preferences with a2 above a1 and receives a2. This occurs with
probability p12 and yields a conditional expected utility of v2. Then U2(a1, σ1|a1 ∈
O2) = (1− p12)(v1 + η12) + p12v2.
Under σ2 = a2, if ε22 < v1 − v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with a1 above
a2 and receives a1. This occurs with probability 1 − p12 and yields a conditional
expected utility of v1. If instead ε22 > v1− v2, then agent 2 reports preferences with
a2 above a1 and receives a2. This occurs with probability p12 and yields a conditional
expected utility of v2 +η21. Then U2(a2, σ1|a1 ∈ O2) = (1−p12)v1 +p12(v2 +η21). By
Lemma 1(2), p12η21 = (1 − p12)η12. Therefore, U2(a1, σ1|a1 ∈ O2) = U2(a2, σ1|a1 ∈
O2).
Now suppose a1 6∈ O2. Then agent 2 receives a2. As this is independent of σ2,
U2(a1, σ1|a1 6∈ O2) = U2(a2, σ1|a1 6∈ O2) = v2. Altogether, U2(a1, σ1) = U2(a2, σ1).
Combining results, if n = m = 2, then each profile σ ∈ AN constitutes an equilibrium.
A.4 Proofs of Proposition 2 and Theorem 1
We first provide explicit formulas for the equilibrium welfare of each agent under
SD and TTC. To do so, we introduce some additional notation. For each k ∈ N ,
let Nk ≡ {1, . . . , k − 1}. Then under SD, Nk is the set agents with higher priority
than agent k. Similarly, under TTC, Nk is the set of agents whose endowments have
common values higher than the common value of agent k’s endowment. For each
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pair l, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} with l ≤ k, let
P (l, k) ≡

1 if l = k
pl(l+1) · pl(l+2) · · · plk if l < k
and recursively define
Q(l, k) ≡

P (l, k) if l = 1
1−∑k−1h=1Q(h, k) if 1 < l = k
Q(l, l) · P (l, k) if 1 < l < k
.
Lemma 2 below allows us to interpret these products in terms of agents’ options sets:
under either SD or TTC, Q(l, k) represents the probability that al is the object with
the highest common value in agent k’s option set.
Lemma 2. For each pair l, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with l ≤ k, Q(l, k) is the probability that
(i) al has the highest common value in agent k’s option set under SD and (ii) al has
the highest common value in agent k’s option set under TTC.
Proof. Let l, k ∈ {1, . . . , n} with l < k. After verifying the probabilities for l < k,
the formula for l = k follows by subtraction. Let σ≺, σµ ∈ AN be equilibria under
SD and TTC respectively and let P≺, P µ ∈ PN be preferences determined by σ≺
and σµ. That is, P≺ and P µ are random variables that depend on the realizations
of εσ≺ and εσµ respectively.
Without loss of generality, suppose that for each i ∈ N , σ≺i = ai+1 and σµi = ai
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where am+1 = a1 if necessary.
(i) Priority rule. According to σ≺, agents in Nk receive at least k−1 of the objects
{a1, . . . , ak}. Thus, agent k’s option set contains exactly one of these objects and
the cases are mutually exclusive. Now suppose al ∈ Ok(P≺−k, SD). Then no agent in
Nk receives al. We verify the probabilities by induction on l.
Case 1.1: l = 1. Then for each i ∈ Nk, agent i receives ai+1. Therefore, ai+1 P≺i
a1 which occurs with probability p1(i+1). Since these events are independent, the
probability that a1 ∈ Ok(P≺−k, SD) is p12 · p13 · · · p1k = Q(1, k).
Case 1.2: l = 2. Then agent 1 receives a1 and for each i ∈ Nk\{1}, agent i re-
ceives ai+1. Therefore, a1 P
≺
1 a2 which occurs with probability 1−p12 = 1−Q(1, 2) =
Q(2, 2). Also, for each i ∈ Nk\{1}, ai+1 P≺i a2 which occurs with probability p2(i+1).
Since these events are independent, the probability that a2 ∈ Ok(P≺−k, SD) is
(1− p12)p23 · p24 · · · p2k = Q(2, 2)P (2, k) = Q(2, k).
Case 1.3: l ≥ 3. Suppose the claim is true for each i < l. Then the agents in Nk
collectively receive {a1, . . . , al−1, al+1, . . . , ak}. Moreover, since each agent i always
receives an object among {a1, . . . , ai+1}, this implies that the agents N l collectively
receive {a1, . . . , al−1}. Therefore, {a1, . . . , al−1} ∩ Ol(P≺−l, SD) = ∅. By hypothesis,
for each i < l, Q(i, l) is the probability that ai ∈ Ol(P≺−l, SD), so 1 − Q(i, l) is
the probability ai 6∈ Ol(P≺−l, SD). By mutual exclusivity, 1 −
∑l−1
i=1Q(i, l) is the
probability that {a1, . . . , al−1} ∩Ol(P≺−l, SD) = ∅. Next, for each i ∈ Nk\(N l ∪ {l}),
agent i receives ai+1. Therefore, ai+1 P
≺
i al which occurs with probability pl(i+1).
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Since these events are independent, the probability that al ∈ Ok(P≺−k, SD) is
(
1−
l−1∑
i=1
Q(i, l)
)
pl(l+1) · pl(l+2) · · · plk = Q(l, l) · P (l, k) = Q(l, k).
Finally, since agent k’s option set under SD always includes exactly one of
{a1, . . . , ak}, the probability that ak ∈ Ok(P≺−k, SD) is 1−
∑k−1
i=1 Q(i, k) = Q(k, k).
(ii) Top trading cycles rule. According to σµ, each agent i reports preferences that
agree with P0 on A\{µi}. Thus, for each pair i, j ∈ N with i < j, Oj(P µ−j, TTC) ⊆
Oi(P
µ
−i, TTC). Moreover, if agent i receives aj, then agent j receives ai and for
each h ∈ N with i < h < j, agent h receives µh = ah. In particular, the events
ai ∈ Oj(P µ−j, TTC) and ah ∈ Oj(P µ−j, TTC) are mutually exclusive. Now suppose
al ∈ Ok(P µ−k, TTC). Then no agent in Nk receives al. We verify the probabilities by
induction on l.
Case 2.1: l = 1. Then ak P
µ
1 a1. This occurs with probability p1k. Furthermore,
{a1, . . . , ak−1}∩O1(P µ−1, TTC) = {a1}. For each i ∈ Nk\{1}, ai 6∈ O1(P µ−1, TTC) im-
plies ai P
µ
i a1 which occurs with probability p1i. Since these events are independent,
the probability that a1 ∈ Ok(P µ−k, TTC) is p1k · p12 · p13 · · · p1(k−1) = Q(1, k).
Case 2.2: l = 2. Then ak P
µ
2 a2. This occurs with probability p2k. Furthermore,
{a1, . . . , ak−1} ∩ O2(P µ−2, TTC) = {a2}. For each i ∈ Nk\{2}, ai 6∈ O2(P µ−2, TTC)
implies ai P
µ
i a2. This occurs for i = 1 with probability 1− p12 = 1−Q(1, 2) and for
i > 2 with probability p2i. Since these events are independent, the probability that
a2 ∈ Ok(P µ−k, TTC) is p2k(1− p12) · p23 · · · p2(k−1) = Q(2, k).
Case 2.3: l ≥ 3. Suppose the claim is true for each i < l. Then ak P µl al. This
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occurs with probability plk. Furthermore, {a1, . . . , ak−1} ∩Ol(P µ−l, TTC) = {al}. By
hypothesis, for each i < l, Q(i, l) is the probability that ai ∈ Ol(P µ−l, TTC), so 1 −
Q(i, l) is the probability ai 6∈ Ol(P µ−l, TTC). By mutual exclusivity, 1−
∑l−1
i=1Q(i, l) is
the probability that {a1, . . . , al−1}∩Ol(P µ−l, TTC) = ∅. Next, for each i ∈ Nk\(N l ∪
{l}), ai 6∈ Ol(P µ−l, TTC) implies ai P µi al which occurs with probability pil. Since
these events are independent, the probability that al ∈ Ok(P µ−k, TTC) is
plk
(
1−
l−1∑
i=1
Q(i, l)
)
pl(l+1) · pl(l+2) · · · pl(k−1) = Q(l, l) · P (l, k) = Q(l, k).
Finally, since agent k’s option set under TTC always includes ak, the probabil-
ity that ak is the object in Ok(P
µ
−k, TTC) with the highest common value is then
Ok(P
µ
−k, TTC) is 1−
∑k−1
i=1 Q(i, k) = Q(k, k).
We now provide formulas for the each agent’s equilibrium utility. For ease of
notation, we adopt the conventions that am+1 ≡ a1 and for each k ∈ N , pk(m+1) ≡ 0
and η(m+1)k ≡ 0.
Lemma 3. Let σ ∈ AN be an equilibrium under SD. Then for each k ∈ N ,
Uk(σ, SD) =
k∑
l=1
Q(l, k)
[
(1− pl(k+1))vl + pl(k+1)(vk+1 + η(k+1)l)
]
.
Proof. Let σ ∈ AN be an equilibrium under SD, P ∈ PN be preferences determined
by σ, and k ∈ N . Without loss of generality, suppose σk = ak+1. We interpret
the expressions in the formula as expected utilities conditional on the realization of
agent k’s option set.
55
According to SD, exactly one of {a1, . . . , ak} is in Ok(P−k, SD) so these events
are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. By Lemma 2, for each l ∈ {1, . . . , k}, al ∈
Ok(P−k, SD) with probability Q(l, k). In this case, agent k reports preferences with
either al or ak+1 at the top of Ok(P−k, SD) and receives that object. If εk(k+1) <
vl − vk+1, then al Pk ak+1 and agent k receives al. This occurs with probability
1−pl(k+1) and yields a conditional expected utility of vl. If instead εk(k+1) > vl−vk+1,
then ak+1 Pk al and agent k receives ak+1. This occurs with probability pl(k+1) and
yields a conditional expected utility of vk+1 + η(k+1)l. Thus
Uk
(
σ, SD
∣∣al ∈ Ok(P−k, SD)) = (1− pl(k+1))vl + pl(k+1)(vk+1 + η(k+1)l).
The stated formula follows by taking an expectation over the realization of the option
set.
Lemma 4. Let σ ∈ AN be an equilibrium under TTC. Then for each k ∈ N ,
Uk(σ, TTC) =
k−1∑
l=1
Q(l, k) [(1− plk)vl + plk(vk + ηkl)]
+
n∑
l=k+1
(
Q(k, l − 1)−Q(k, l)) [(1− pkl)(vk + ηkl) + pklvl]
+Q(k, n)
[
(1− pk(n+1))(vk + ηk(n+1)) + pk(n+1)vn+1
]
.
Proof. Let σ ∈ AN be an equilibrium under TTC, P ∈ PN be preferences de-
termined by σ, and k ∈ N . Without loss of generality, suppose that σk = ak.
We interpret the expressions in the formula as expected utilities conditional on
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the realization of agent k’s option set. Suppose Ok(P−k, TTC)\{ak} 6= ∅ and let
al ∈ Ok(P−k, TTC)\{ak} be the object with the highest common value.
Case 1: l < k. Then agent k reports preferences with either al or ak at the top of
Ok(P−k, TTC) and receives that object. If εkk < vl − vk, then al Pk ak and agent k
receives al. This occurs with probability 1 − plk and yields a conditional expected
utility of vl. If instead εkk > vl − vk, then ak Pk al and agent k receives ak. This
occurs with probability plk and yields a conditional expected utility of vk +ηkl. Then
Uk
(
σ, TTC
∣∣al ∈ Ok(P−k, TTC)) = (1− plk)vl + plk(vk + ηkl).
By Lemma 2, this occurs with probability Q(l, k). Taking expectations yields the
first summation in the stated formula.
Case 2: k < l ≤ n. Then agent k reports preferences with either ak or al at the
top of Ok(P−k, TTC) and receives that object. If εkk > vl − vk, then ak Pk al and
agent k receives ak. This occurs with probability 1 − pkl and yields a conditional
expected utility of vk + ηkl. If instead εkk < vl − vk, then al Pk ak and agent k
receives al. This occurs with probability pkl and yields a conditional expected utility
of vl. Then
Uk
(
σ, TTC
∣∣Ok(P−k, TTC) ∩ {a1, . . . , al} = {ak, al}) = (1− pkl)vl + pkl(vk + ηkl).
We now compute the probability that Ok(P−k, TTC) ∩ {a1, . . . , al} = {ak, al}.
This requires that {a1, . . . , ak−1} ∩ Ok(P−k, TTC) = ∅. By Lemma 2, this occurs
with probability Q(k, k) and this depends only on the preferences of agents in Nk.
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Now consider i ∈ N with k < i. Then also {a1, . . . , ak−1}∩Oi(P−i, TTC) = ∅. Since
each such agent i reports preferences that agree with P0 on A\{µi}, agent i reports
preferences with either ak or ai at the top of A\{a1, . . . , ak−1}. If εii < vk − vi, then
ak Pi ai and ai ∈ Ok(P−k, TTC). This occurs with probability 1 − pki. If instead
εii > vk− vi, then ai Pi ak and ai 6∈ Ok(P−k, TTC). This occurs with probability pki.
Conditional on the preferences of agents in Nk, for each pair i, j ∈ N with k < i < j,
the events ai ∈ Ok(P−k, TTC) and aj ∈ Ok(P−k, TTC) are independent. Combining
results,
Pr
(
Ok(P−k, TTC) ∩ {a1, . . . , al} = {ak, al}
)
= Q(k, k) · pk(k+1) · pk(k+2) · · · pk(l−1) · (1− pkl)
= Q(k, l − 1)−Q(k, l).
Taking expectations yields the second summation in the stated formula.
Case 3: n < l. Then l = n + 1. Agent k reports preferences with one of ak and
an+1 at the top of Ok(P−k, TTC) and receives that object. If εkk > vn+1 − vk, then
ak Pk an+1 and agent k receives ak. This occurs with probability 1 − pk(n+1) and
yields a conditional expected utility of vk + ηk(n+1). If instead εkk < vn+1 − vk, then
an+1 Pk ak and agent k receives al. This occurs with probability pk(n+1) and yields a
conditional expected utility of vn+1. Then
Uk
(
σ, TTC
∣∣Ok(P−k, TTC) ∩ {a1, . . . , al} = {ak, an+1})
= (1− pk(n+1))(vk + ηk(n+1)) + pk(n+1)vn+1.
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We now compute Pr(Ok(P−k, TTC) ∩ {a1, . . . , al} = {ak, al}). If n < m, then
Case 3 occurs with the remaining probability after considering the events of Cases 1
and 2,
1−
k−1∑
h=1
Q(h, k)−
n∑
l=k+1
[
Q(k, l − 1)−Q(k, l)] = Q(k, k)− [Q(k, k)−Q(k, n)]
= Q(k, n).
This yields final term in the stated formula.
If n = m, then Case 3 does not occur. Instead, still with probability Q(k, n),
Ok(P−k, TTC)\{ak} = ∅. Then Ok(P−k, TTC) = {ak} and agent k receives ak
regardless of his preferences. This yields a conditional expected utility of vk. Given
our conventions ηk(m+1) = 0 and pk(m+1) = 0, the expression in Case 3 simplifies to
vk and the stated formula applies.
For reference, Corollaries 2 and 3 simplify the utility formulas from Lemmas 3
and 4 for the special case of m = n = 2.
Corollary 2. Let σ≺ ∈ AN be an equilibrium under SD. If n = m = 2, then
U1(σ
≺, SD) = (1− p12)v1 + p12(v2 + η21) and
U2(σ
≺, SD) = (1− p12)v2 + p12v1.
Corollary 3. Let σµ ∈ AN be an equilibrium under TTC. If n = m = 2, then
U1(σ
µ, TTC) = (1− p12)
[
(1− p12)(v1 + η12) + p12v2
]
+ p12v1 and
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U2(σ
µ, TTC) = p12
[
p12(v2 + η21) + (1− p12)v1
]
+ (1− p12)v2.
A.4.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We argue by inspecting the formulas derived in Lemmas 3 and 4. Let n,m ∈ N
with n ≤ m and let σ≺, σµ ∈ AN be equilibria under SD and TTC respectively. We
proceed by induction on the number of agents and objects. Let Un,m(ϕ) be the sum
of the agents’ ex-ante equilibrium utilities under ϕ. Let U0(k) ≡
∑k
i=1 vi. So U0(n)
is the utilitarian welfare without learning.
Step 1: n = m = 2. By Corollary 2,
U2,2(SD) = U2,21 (σ
≺, SD) + U2,22 (σ
≺, SD)
= [(1− p12)v1 + p12(v2 + η21)] + [(1− p12)v2 + p12v1]
= U0(n) + p12η21.
By Lemma 1(2), (1− p12)η12 = p12η21. Now by Corollary 3,
U2,2(TTC) = U2,21 (σ
µ, TTC) + U2,22 (σ
µ, TTC)
= (1− p12)
[
(1− p12)(v1 + η12) + p12v2
]
+ p12v1
+ p12
[
p12(v2 + η21) + (1− p12)v1
]
+ (1− p12)v2
= U0(n) + (1− p12)(1− p12)η12 + p12p12η21
= U0(n) + (1− p12)p12η21 + p12p12η21
= U0(n) + p12η21.
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Therefore, U2,2(SD) = U2,2(TTC).
Step 2: Increasing the number of objects. Suppose Un,n(SD) = Un,n(TTC).
Under either rule, objects {an+2, an+3, . . . , am} are never allocated and so all agents
are indifferent to their presence. Thus, it suffices to consider m = n + 1. Since our
hypothesis applies to all problems with n agents and n objects, we may suppose the
new object has the lowest common value among all objects, namely vn+1.
Under SD, only agent n ever receives an+1, and the difference in utilitarian welfare
between Un,n(SD) and Un,n+1(SD) is the difference in agent n’s ex-ante expected
utility. Then by Lemma 3,
Un,n+1(SD)− Un,n(SD)
= Un,n+1n (σ
≺, SD)− Un,nn (σ≺, SD)
=
n∑
l=1
Q(l, n)
[
(1− pl(n+1))vl + pl(n+1)(vn+1 + η(n+1)l)
]− n∑
l=1
Q(l, n)vl
=
n∑
l=1
Q(l, n)pl(n+1)(vn+1 + η(n+1)l − vl).
Under TTC, the arrival of the new object increases each agent’s ex-ante expected
utility. For each k ∈ N , the difference is the last term in the expression for Uk in
Lemma 4:
Un,n+1k (σ
µ, TTC)− Un,nk (σµ, TTC)
= Q(k, n)
[
(1− pk(n+1))(vk + ηk(n+1)) + pk(n+1)vn+1
]−Q(k, n)vk
= Q(k, n)
[
(1− pk(n+1))ηk(n+1) + pk(n+1)(vn+1 − vk)
]
.
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By Lemma 1(2), (1 − pk(n+1))ηk(n+1)l = pk(n+1)η(n+1)k. Substituting and summing
over agents,
Un,n+1(TTC)− Un,n(TTC) =
n∑
k=1
Q(k, n)
[
(1− pk(n+1))ηk(n+1) + pk(n+1)(vn+1 − vk)
]
=
n∑
k=1
Q(k, n)
[
pk(n+1)η(n+1)k + pk(n+1)(vn+1 − vk)
]
=
n∑
k=1
Q(k, n)pk(n+1)(vn+1 + η(n+1)k − vk).
Then Un,n+1(SD) − Un,n(SD) = Un,n+1(TTC) − Un,n(TTC). By hypothesis,
Un,n(SD) = Un,n(TTC), so Un,n+1(SD) = Un,n+1(TTC) as well.
Step 3: Increasing the number of agents. Suppose Un−1,n(SD) =
Un−1,n(TTC). Since our hypothesis applies to all problems with n− 1 agents and n
objects, we may assume that the new agent has the lowest priority under SD and is
endowed with an under TTC.
Under SD, the arrival of agent n has no effect on the allocations or ex-ante ex-
pected utilities of the original agents. Therefore, the difference in utilitarian welfare
is the ex-ante expected utility of agent n. Also, agent n has no meaningful investiga-
tion decision. This is reflected by our conventions pl(m+1) = 0 and η(m+1)l = 0. Then
by Lemma 3,
Un,n(SD)− Un−1,n(SD) = Un,nn (σ≺, SD)
=
n∑
l=1
Q(l, n)
[
(1− pl(n+1))vl + pl(n+1)(vn+1 + η(n+1)l)
]
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=
n∑
l=1
Q(l, n)vl.
Under TTC, the arrival of the new agent decreases each original agent’s ex-ante
expected utility. The difference arises because an may now be unavailable. In terms
of Lemma 4, for each k ∈ N , the comparison between ak and an moves from the final
term into the second summation. The difference is
Un,nk (σ
µ,TTC)− Un−1,nk (σµ, TTC)
=
(
Q(k, n− 1)−Q(k, n))[(1− pkn)(vk + ηkn) + pknvn]+Q(k, n)vk
−Q(k, n− 1) [(1− pkn)(vk + ηkn) + pknvn]
= −Q(k, n)[(1− pkn)(vk + ηkn) + pknvn]+Q(k, n)vk
= −Q(k, n)[(1− pkn)ηkn + pkn(vn − vk)].
By Lemma 1(2), (1− pkn)ηkn = pknηnk. Substituting and summing over the original
agents,
n−1∑
k=1
Un,nk (σ
µ, TTC)− Un−1,nk (σµ, TTC) =
n−1∑
k=1
−Q(k, n)[(1− pkn)ηkn + pkn(vn − vk)]
=
n−1∑
k=1
−Q(k, n)pkn(vn + ηnk − vk).
Now agent n’s ex-ante expected utility is
Un,nn (σ
µ, TTC) =
n−1∑
l=1
Q(l, n)
[
(1− pln)vl + pln(vn + ηnl)
]
+Q(n, n)vn.
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Combining results,
Un,n(TTC)− Un−1,n(TTC)
= Un,nn (σ
µ, TTC) +
n−1∑
k=1
Un,nk (σ
µ, TTC)− Un−1,nk (σµ, TTC)
= Q(n, n)vn +
n−1∑
l=1
Q(l, n)
[
(1− pln)vl + pln(vn + ηnl)
]
−
n−1∑
k=1
Q(k, n)pkn(vn + ηnk − vk)
= Q(n, n)vn +
n−1∑
l=1
Q(l, n)
[
(1− pln)vl + pln(vn + ηnl)− pln(vn + ηnl − vl)
]
= Q(n, n)vn +
n−1∑
l=1
Q(l, n)vl
=
n∑
l=1
Q(l, n)vl.
Therefore, Un,n(SD) = Un,n(TTC).
A.4.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Let m ∈ N. We show that for each n ∈ N with n ≤ m, the equilibrium utility
profile under TTC Lorenz dominates the equilibrium utility profile under SD when
there are n agents. For each n ∈ N and each k ∈ N with k ≤ n, let Unk (SD) be the
equilibrium utility under SD of the agent with kth highest priority when there are
n agents. Similarly, let Unk (TTC) be the equilibrium utility under TTC of the agent
whose endowment has the kth highest priority when there are n agents. Explicit
formulas for theses expressions are computed in Lemmas 3 and 4.
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By Proposition 2, each rule yields the same total utility. Moreover, the proof of
Proposition 2 shows that (i) the utility of a given agent under SD is independent of
the number of agents with lower priority; and (ii) the utility of a given agent under
TTC is decreasing in the number of agents with lower priority. That is, for each
n, k ∈ N with k ≤ m,
n∑
k=1
Unk (SD) =
n∑
k=1
Unk (TTC),
Ukk (SD) = U
k+1
k (SD) = · · · = Unk (SD), and
Ukk (TTC) > U
k+1
k (TTC) > · · · > Unk (TTC).
First, U11 (SD) = U
1
1 (TTC). Now comparing for n = 2, U
2
1 (SD) = U
1
1 (SD) =
U11 (TTC) > U
2
1 (TTC). Also, U
2
1 (SD) + U
2
2 (SD) = U
2
1 (TTC) + U
2
2 (TTC), so
U22 (SD) = U
2
1 (TTC) + U
2
2 (TTC) − U21 (SD) < U22 (TTC). Thus, U2(TTC) Lorenz
dominates U2(SD).
Now in general, for each pair n, l ∈ N with l ≤ n,
l∑
k=1
Unk (SD) =
l∑
k=1
U lk(SD) =
l∑
k=1
U lk(TTC) <
l∑
k=1
Unk (TTC).
Comparing the utilities of the less well off agents,
n∑
k=l
Unk (SD) =
n∑
k=1
Unk (SD)−
l∑
k=1
Unk (SD)
=
n∑
k=1
Unk (TTC)−
l∑
k=1
Unk (SD)
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<n∑
k=1
Unk (TTC)−
l∑
k=1
Unk (TTC)
=
n∑
k=l
Unk (TTC).
That is, Un(TTC) Lorenz dominates Un(SD).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We omit the straightforward argument that priority rules are efficient.40 There are
two cases to consider in showing that TTC rules are not efficient when m ≥ 3.
Case 1: 2 = n and m = 3. We show by example that TTC is not ex-ante efficient.
Let (v1, v2, v3) ≡ (50, 49, 30) and F ∼ Unif [−30, 30]. Then p12 = 2960 , p13 = 1060 , and
p23 =
11
60
. Let σ ≡ (a1, a2), which is the unique equilibrium under TTC. We construct
a rule that yields an ex-ante Pareto improvement with σ. Let P¯ , P¯ ′ ∈ PN be such
that
P¯1 P¯2 P¯
′
1 P¯
′
2
a1 a1 a2 a2
a2 a3 a3 a1
a3 a2 a1 a3
Now define ϕ : PN → X by
ϕ(P ) ≡

(a2, a1) if P = P¯ or P = P¯
′
TTC(P ) otherwise
.
40See Bade (2015) for a proof that can be translated to our setting.
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To compare ex-ante expected utilities, let εσ ∈ RN . If P (εσ) 6∈ {P¯ , P¯ ′}, then
(σ, ϕ) and (σ, TTC) coincide, so suppose P (εσ) ∈ {P¯ , P¯ ′}. The allocations are
ϕ(P¯ ) = ϕ(P¯ ′) = (a2, a1), TTC(P¯ ) = (a1, a3), and TTC(P¯ ′) = (a3, a2). Under (σ, ϕ),
agent 1’s conditional expected utility is v2 = 49 and agent 2’s conditional expected
utility is v1 = 50.
We now compute the conditional expected utilities under (σ, TTC). First,
Pr(P1(εσ) = P¯1) = 1 − p12 = 3160 , Pr(P2(εσ) = P¯2) = p23 = 1160 , Pr(P1(εσ) =
P¯ ′1) = p13 =
10
60
, and Pr(P2(εσ) = P¯
′
2) = p12 =
29
60
. Therefore, by independence,
Pr
(
P (εσ) = P¯
)
= 31
60
· 11
60
= 341
3600
,
P r
(
P (εσ) = P¯
′) = 10
60
· 29
60
= 290
3600
,
P r
(
P (εσ) = P¯
∣∣P (εσ) ∈ {P¯ , P¯ ′}) = 341631 , and
Pr
(
P (εσ) = P¯
′∣∣P (εσ) ∈ {P¯ , P¯ ′}) = 290631 .
Next, computing expectations,
E[v1 + ε11|P (εσ) = P¯ ] = 50 + 12(−1 + 30) = 64.5 and
E[v2 + ε22|P (εσ) = P¯ ′] = 49 + 12(1 + 30) = 64.5.
Combining results,
U1
(
σ, TTC
∣∣P (εσ) ∈ {P¯ , P¯ ′}) = 341631 · 64.5 + 290631 · 30 = 613891262 ≈ 48.64 < 49 and
U2
(
σ, TTC
∣∣P (εσ) ∈ {P¯ , P¯ ′}) = 341631 · 30 + 290631 · 64.5 = 578701262 ≈ 45.86 < 50.
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Therefore, each agent’s ex-ante expected utility is higher under ϕ than under TTC.
Case 2: 3 < m. We show how to embed the example in Case 1 as a subproblem.
First, for 2 = n < m, only the objects with the three highest common values are
relevant and so the computations carry over unchanged.
Now suppose 2 < n ≤ m. Since no agent receives an object an+2, . . . , am in
equilibrium, suppose without loss of generality that m ∈ {n, n + 1}. Again let
F ∼ Unif [−30, 30] and let v ∈ Rm be such that (v1, v2, vm) ≡ (50, 49, 30) and
49 > v4 > · · · > 30 = vm. Let P¯ , P¯ ′ ∈ PN be such that for each i ∈ N\{1, 2},
P¯1 P¯2 P¯i P¯
′
1 P¯
′
2 P¯
′
i
a1 a1 ai a2 a2 ai
a2 a3 a1 a3 a1 a1
...
...
...
...
...
...
am−1 am am−1 am am−1 am−1
am a2 am a1 am am
Then P¯ and P¯ ′ each occur with positive probability under σµ. Moreover, for each
i ∈ N\{1, 2} and each εσ ∈ RN such that P (εσ) ∈ {P¯ , P¯ ′}, TTCi(P (εσ)) = ai = µi.
Therefore, we may extend the definition of ϕ in Case 1 so that for each i ∈ N\{1, 2}
and each εσ ∈ RN , ϕi(P (εσ)) = TTCi(P (εσ)). Then agent i’s expected utility is the
same under ϕ and under TTC. If m = n+ 1, then the conditional expected utilities
for agents 1 and 2 are the same as in Case 1. If instead m = n, then the conditional
expected utilities for agents 1 and 2 are the lower than in Case 1 because each agent
receives his endowment. In either case, ϕ represents an ex-ante Pareto improvement
over TTC.
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While we have shown TTC may be Pareto-dominated, Theorem 1 implies that
SD does not dominate it.
A.6 Further examples
A.6.1 Randomizing before versus after learning
Randomizing over priority orders is a typical way to (re-)introduce fairness into
the assignment problem. When the randomization is conducted before agents make
learning decisions, the procedure simply redistributes ex-ante expected utility with
uniform randomization equalizing these values across agents. The sum of these util-
ities, the Utilitarian social welfare, is unaffected by the randomization. However, if
the randomization instead occurs after agents investigate, it mutes learning bene-
fits, reducing Utilitarian social welfare. In fact, the loss may be large enough that
an asymmetric fixed-endowment TTC rule yields a profile of ex-ante utilities which
Pareto dominates that achieved by randomizing over priority orders. To illustrate,
we revisit the motivating example.
Example 2. Suppose that there are three schools with utility information as spec-
ified in Table 1. To keep computations simple, we restrict the environment to two
students.
Fixed priorities and endowments. Label the students so that student 1 has
higher priority or is endowed with the Ivy school and student 2 has lower priority or
is endowed with the state school. Under SD and TTC, the investigation strategies
and ex-ante utilities of the two students are the same as computed previously:
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SD
Student Expected utility
1 1
2
· 14 + 1
2
· 7 = 10.5
2 1
2
· 10 + 1
4
· 9 + 1
4
· 7 = 9.0
TTC
Student Expected utility
1 1
2
· 14 + 1
4
· 7 + 1
4
· 5 = 10.0
2 1
2
· 12 + 1
4
· 9 + 1
4
· 5 = 9.5
Randomization over priority orders. Suppose that the designer randomizes
uniformly over priority orders after students investigate. There are six possible com-
binations of (pure) investigation strategies, each with four outcomes of investigation
according to whether the realized values are high or low. Students’ ex-ante utilities
in each case are:
Strategy HH HL LH LL utility
Ivy vs. Ivy 1
2
· 14 + 1
2
· 7 14 7 1
2
· 7 + 1
2
· 5 9.375
State vs. Ivy 12 1
2
· 12 + 1
2
· 9 1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 5 9 9.675
Tech vs. Ivy 10 1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 7 10 9 9.25
Ivy vs. State 14 1
2
· 14 + 1
2
· 7 1
2
· 7 + 1
2
· 5 7 9.375
State vs. State 1
2
· 12 + 1
2
· 9 12 9 1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 5 9.625
Tech vs. State 10 10 9 1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 7 9.25
Ivy vs. Tech 14 1
2
· 14 + 1
2
· 7 7 7 9.625
State vs. Tech 12 12 9 1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 5 10.0
Tech vs . Tech 1
2
· 10 + 1
2
· 9 10 9 1
2
· 9 + 1
2
· 7 9.125
Investigating the State school is a strictly dominant strategy for each student and
State vs. State in the unique equilibrium.
Equilibrium welfare comparison. The students equilibrium ex-ante utilities un-
der SD, TTC, and randomization are:
Rule Student 1 Student 2 Utilitarian social welfare
SD 10.5 9 19.5
TTC 10 9.5 19.5
Random priority 9.675 9.675 19.25
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Randomization achieves the lowest Utilitarian social welfare, illustrating the ef-
ficiency cost of randomization after investigation decisions are set.
Potential for Pareto inferior equilibrium. Although the ex-ante utility profiles
in the previous example are not Pareto-comparable, it is possible for TTC to Pareto
dominate randomization. Modify the utilities in the example so that:
School Good fit Bad fit Expectation
Ivy 8 2 5
State 7 1 4
Technical 6 0 3
In the equilibrium under randomization, both students again investigate the State
school. At equilibrium under randomization, the ex-ante utility of each student is:
1
4
[
1
2
(7 + 5) + 7 + 5 + 1
2
(5 + 3)
]
= 5.5.
By contrast, under TTC, their ex-ante utilities are:
Student 1: 1
2
· 8 + 1
4
· 4 + 1
4
· 3 = 5.75
Student 2: 1
2
· 7 + 1
4
· 5 + 1
4
· 3 = 5.5
The outcome under TTC ex-ante Pareto-dominates the outcome under randomiza-
tion.
A.6.2 Welfare under Hierarchical Exchange rules
The priority and TTC rules we study are examples of Hierarchical Exchange rules
(Pa´pai 2000a), all of which are themselves members of an even larger family of group
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strategy-proof exchange rules (Pycia and U¨nver 2016). Intuitively, priority and TTC
rules lie at opposite extremes within either family, priority rules maximally concen-
trating endowments and TTC rules distributing them most widely. Despite their
differences, these rules achieve the same Utilitarian social welfare (Proposition 2).
Surprisingly, this equivalence does not extend even to the family of Hierarchical
exchange rules with other rules falling short of this benchmark. To illustrate, we
consider a conditional priority rule, a narrow modification of a priority rule which
allows assignments of high priority agents to determine the order of those who re-
main. The intuition is similar to randomization: Conditional ordering increases the
uncertainly agents face about their option sets, thereby dampening their benefits
from investigation.
Example 3. Suppose that there are three agents and four objects with v =
(16, 14, 12, 8) and εia ∈ {−10, 10} with equal probability. Let SˆD be a conditional
priority rule in which agent 1 chooses first and is followed by agent 2 if assigned a1
and by agent 3 otherwise.
Fixed priority. Under SD, agent 1 optimally investigates either a1 or a2, agent 2
optimally investigates a3, and agent 3 optimally investigates a4. Each agent’s ex-ante
equilibrium utility is:
Expected utility
Agent 1 1
2
· 26 + 1
2
· 24 = 1
2
· 16 + 1
2
· 24 = 20
Agent 2 1
2
· 22 + 1
4
· 16 + 1
4
· 14 = 18.5
Agent 3 1
2
· 18 + 1
8
· 16 + 1
8
· 14 + 1
4
· 12 = 15.75
Conditional priority. Agent 1 faces the same problem as under a priority rule.
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He investigates either a1 or a2, is assigned each object with equal probability, and
obtains an ex-ante utility of 20.
Consider agent 2 problem. He faces one of four possible options sets: If agent 1
is assigned a1, then his option set is {a2, a3, a4}; if agent 1 is assigned a2, then his
option set is {a3, a4}, {a1, a4}, or {a1, a3}, according to whether agent 3 receives a1,
a3, or a4. If agent 3 investigates a1, then {a3, a4} and {a1, a4} are equally likely;
if agent 3 investigates a2, then {a3, a4} is certain; if agent 3 investigates a3, then
{a3, a4} and {a1, a4} are equally likely; and if agent 3 investigates a4, then {a1, a3}
and {a3, a4} are equally likely. Based on these observations, we compute agent 2’s
ex-ante utility for each combination of investigation strategies by agent 2 and agent 3
as:
σ2 \ σ3 a1 a2 a3 a4
a1 15.5 16 16 16
a2 14 15 15 15.5
a3 17 16.75 16.75 17.75
a4 16 16.25 16.25 15.75
Comparing, it is a strictly dominant strategy for agent 2 to investigate a3.
Given agent 2’s investigation strategy, agent 3 faces one of three possible options
sets: If agent 1 is assigned a1, then his option is {a3, a4} or {a1, a4} with equal
probability; if agent 1 is assigned a2, then his option set is {a1, a3, a4} with cer-
tainty. Based on these observations, we compute agent 3’s ex-ante utility for each
investigation strategy as:
a1 a2 a3 a4
14.25 16 16.75 16
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Agent 3 optimally investigates a3 and so there is a unique equilibrium in which
both agents investigate a3.
Equilibrium welfare comparison. The agents’ equilibrium ex-ante utilities under
SD and SˆD are:
Rule Agent 1 Agent 2 Agent 3 Utilitarian social welfare
SD 20 18.5 15.75 54.25
SˆD 20 16.75 16.75 53.5
Utilitarian social welfare is higher under SD than under SˆD.
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